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LET SLEEPING MEMORIES LIE? WORDS
OF CAUTION ABOUT TOLLING THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN
CASES OF MEMORY
REPRESSION
GARY M. ERNSDORFF* & ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS**
Tragically, child sexual abuse is a serious and prevalent prob-
lem in our society.' Surveys reveal that as much as one-third of the
population of the United States has experienced some form of child-
hood sexual abuse. 2 Abuse of this nature, in addition to posing an
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M.A., 1967, Ph.D., 1970, Stanford University.
The authors wish to acknowledge the Repressed Memory Research Group at the
University of Washington for numerous helpful discussions.
1 See generally DEBORAH DARO, CONFRONTING CHILD ABUSE (1988).
2 Johnson v.Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1370 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (quoting NATIONAL
LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE:
LEGAL ISSUES AND APPROACHES (rev. ed. 1981)). Estimates of the frequency of child sex
abuse vary depending upon how people are questioned about their past. A study that
many researchers believe is accurate is one conducted by psychologist David Finkelhor
and his colleagues. That study found that 27% of the women and 16% of the men
disclosed a history of sexual abuse. Nina Darnton, The Pain of the Last Taboo, NEWSWEEK,
Oct. 7, 1991, at 70. An earlier estimate of incidence based on a 1978 survey of women
in San Francisco revealed that 28% of women had experienced unwanted sexual touch-
ing and other forms of abuse before the age of 14 and that the percentage of victims
increased to 38% if one extended the age to 18. DIANA RUSSELL, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION:
RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT 180-85 (1984). The perpetrators
were relatives in 12% of the cases. Another source reports 38% of women have been
sexually abused before age 18, with about 4.5% having been victimized by a biological,
adoptive, step or foster father. Mary Gail Frawley, From Secrecy to Self-Disclosure: Healing
the Scars of Incest, in SELF-DISCLOSURE IN THE THERAPEUTIC RELATIONSHIP 247-59 (George
Stricker & Martin Fisher eds., 1990). Other estimates have been somewhat more con-
servative, but still disturbing. In a mail survey of Texas residents, 3% of males and 11%
of females stated they had experienced some form of sexual abuse during their lifetimes.
GLEN A. KERCHER, RESPONDING TO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: A REPORT TO THE 67TH SES-
SION OF THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE 38, 41 (1980) (study found 14 of 461 males and 65 of
593 females reported childhood sexual abuse). In a survey of Boston parents, 6% of
males and 15% of females experienced sexual abuse before the age of 16 by a person at
least five years older. About one-third of the cases involved relatives. DAVID FINKELHOR,
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immediate threat to the physical well-being of the child, can have
debilitating psychological effects that last for years, or even for a
lifetime.
While many victims of childhood sexual abuse remember the
abusive incidents throughout their lifetimes, some victims appar-
ently repress, or subconsciously force, the memories from their
minds.3 Repression in this manner can have immediate benefits for
a child-victim attempting to cope with sexual abuse. Nevertheless,
the psychological damage inflicted by childhood sexual abuse may
remain with the child throughout adulthood. 4 Consider the exam-
ple of Mary Doe:
At age twenty-four, Mary Doe was a troubled young woman.
She had problems with alcohol and drug abuse, possessed low self-
esteem, and suffered from eating disorders. Her behavioral history
was sprinkled with instances of self-mutilation and suicide attempts.
Only after an arrest for drunken driving forced her to seek profes-
sional therapy did Mary Doe begin to understand the source of her
problems. As her therapy progressed, Mary recovered memories
that had been repressed for nearly twenty years. These memories of
her early childhood included the severe sexual abuse inflicted upon
her by her father when she was less then five years old. As the mem-
ories trickled and then flooded back, Mary began to understand
what had caused the immense pain she had been living with for most
of her life.5
Although there is little agreement among psychologists con-
cerning the theory of repression and the recovery of previously re-
pressed memories, therapists claim that the trauma caused by
childhood sexual abuse may lead a victim to repress all memory of
the event. The trauma of childhood sexual abuse is triggered not
only by the fright and pain of the event, but also by the veil of se-
crecy demanded by the abuser and the innocence and dependency
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: NEW THEORY AND RESEARCH 69-86 (1984). In a survey of 2000
Americans, one in seven people confessed that they were victims of sexual abuse as
children, three-quarters of whom were women. JAMES PATTERSON, THE DAY AMERICA
TOLD THE TRUTH 125 (1991).
3 See, e.g., Karen Olio, Memory Retrieval in the Treatment of Adult Survivors of SexualAbuse,
19 TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS J. 93, 93-94 (1989).
4 Judith Herman et al., The Long Term Effects of Incestuous Abuse in Childhood, 143 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1293 (1986). See also Olio, supra note 3, at 93-94 (a 1989 study of nearly 500
adult patients who had been sexually abused found that 60% had experienced "a period
of amnesia" regarding their abuse).
5 Adapted from the facts of Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989). See Kathleen Hendrix, Challenge to Child Abuse: Court Case Widens Options for Adults
Seeking Redress, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1989, at El; Carol Lynn Mithers, Incest and the Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 44.
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of the victim. In response, the child, unable to understand or ade-
quately deal with the event, escapes this psychological turmoil by
pretending the abuse never happened and repressing all conscious
memory of it.
Repressing memories of childhood sexual abuse does not, how-
ever, expunge all related problems. As exemplified in Mary Doe's
case, repression of traumatic memories is thought to be associated
with a number of psychological and behavioral problems for the vic-
tim later in life. As a result of these problems, victims often turn to
psychological therapy, which in turn may lead to the reappearance
of the memories. While many therapists believe recovery of re-
pressed memories has therapeutic effects, such recovery also causes
additional hardships for the victim, some of whom experience grave
doubts and self-blame.6
Along with the emotional hardships associated with recovered
memories, survivors7 may face another obstacle: a legal system
which does not recognize civil or criminal complaints with respect to
those memories. Because repressed memories often do not resur-
face until years after the applicable statute of limitations has ex-
pired, civil and criminal actions are barred.
However, this is changing. In civil litigation, some courts have
responded to the seeming unfairness of a time bar and have found
that the statute of limitations is tolled during the time the survivor
repressed the memory of the abuse. Take the example of Mary Doe:
As a result of her resurfaced memories, Mary filed a civil suit
against her father. Although her suit was filed almost twenty years
after the abuse occurred and over three years after her state's stat-
ute of limitations expired, the court allowed her case to proceed.
The court applied the "discovery rule" and found that the statute of
limitations had been tolled by the repression of her memory;
although Mary possessed the memory she could not access it and
thus only "discovered" the abuse when the memory resurfaced.8
In addition to this increased willingness to allow civil suits into
court, criminal cases based on previously repressed memories also
appear to be on the upswing. Although the discovery rule is not
6 Christine A. Courtois, The Memory Retrieval Process in Incest Survivor Therapy, 1 J.
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 15, 23-27 (1992).
7 Adults who, as children, were sexually abused and have recognized their abuse
choose to be called survivors rather than victims, and we, the authors, adopt that distinc-
tion throughout this article. See, e.g., Don Oldenburg, Dark Memories: Adults Confront Their
Childhood Abuse, WASH. POST, June 20, 1991, at D5. However, throughout this article, we
will use the term "victim" to refer to victims of childhood sexual abuse who do not
recognize their abuse and who have yet to begin a curative process.
8 See Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
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applicable to criminal cases, situations arise whereby a repressed
memory resurfaces before a lengthy (or indefinite) statute of limita-
tion runs out.
This article examines the use of the discovery rule to toll the
statute of limitations in civil cases such as Mary's and examines the
use of a previously repressed memory as the basis for criminal
charges. It finds that survivors who claim a previous inability to ac-
cess their memory may, in rare cases, possess compelling reasons
for tolling the statute of limitations for civil actions against their
abusers. Additional reasons exist to warrant the extending or toll-
ing of the criminal statute of limitations in some rare cases. None-
theless, this article concludes that authenticity and reliability
questions associated with long-repressed memories necessitate both
caution in advancing these actions (particularly in cases without co-
gent corroboration) and a redoubling of research efforts in this area.
To balance these concerns, this article recommends that courts im-
plement procedural safeguards to minimize injustice occurring at
the expense of an innocent defendant.
I. THE THEORY OF REPRESSION As APPLIED To CHILDHOOD
SEXUAL ABUSE
A. A SHORT PRIMER ON REPRESSION
Mary Doe's case is a vivid example of repression, a concept in-
voked to characterize a person who experiences a traumatic event
and then buries the memory deep in the recesses of her 9 mind in
order to avoid the stress or anxiety associated with that memory.' 0
A repressed memory, while theoretically intact in the mind, is not
normally accessible by conscious thought processes. Thus repres-
sion is different from a memory that is permanently forgotten; ac-
cess to a repressed memory may, in theory, be regained at some
future point when a stimulus triggers the retrieval of the memory.
9 The authors recognize that many victims of childhood sexual abuse are male; re-
cent surveys estimate that as many as one in 10 male children will be sexually abused
before they reach the age of 18. However, surveys estimate that as many as one in three
female children will be sexually abused before they reach the age of 18. Herman et al.,
supra note 4, at 1293. Given the disproportionately high number of female victims, this
article uses the female pronoun when referring to childhood sexual abuse victims. Addi-
tionally, the authors use the male pronoun when referring to perpetrators of childhood
sexual abuse since reports suggest that 97 to 98% of child sexual abusers are male.
Denise J. Gelinas, The Persisting Negative Effects of Incest, 46 PSYCHIATRY 312, 313 (1983).
10 Elizabeth Loftus & Leah Kaufman, Why Do Traumatic Experiences Sometimes Produce
Good Alemory (Flashbulbs) and Sometimes No Memory (Repression)?, in AFFECT AND ACCURACY




According to theory, the mind uses repression as a defensive
maneuver that pushes unacceptable ideas into the "unconscious." 11
Thus, a person who experiences a particularly traumatic event may
find it difficult or impossible to function normally while simultane-
ously maintaining memories of the event. The memories are simply
too overwhelming. In order to cope with the traumatic event and to
function in life, the victim represses memory of the trauma. In other
words, the victim keeps a secret even from herself, or, in the case of
multiple personality, keeps the secret within one functioning per-
sonality that has little or no interaction with another personality.' 2
Many types of trauma may lead a victim to repression. Repres-
sion may occur in cases of extreme physical injury, as it did with the
"Central Park Jogger" who, in 1989, was brutally attacked, repeat-
edly raped and left for dead, and yet retains no memory of the inci-
dent.13 But repression can also apparently happen in the absence of
severe physical injury, where there is only "mental shock." Thus,
Mary Doe, suffering a severe psychological shock, apparently re-
pressed all memory of the sexual abuse her father inflicted upon
her. Similarly, claims are made that returning war veterans repress
memories of intensely frightening battles, even when they them-
selves have not been physically injured.' 4
The traumatic nature of events that leads to repression, how-
ever, virtually precludes experimental probing of the theory; re-
searchers have yet to design experiments that will enable them to
study the repression and subsequent retrieval of a memory. Thus,
while traditional memory is neatly divided into three distinct
phases-perception, retention, and retrieval'5-a repressed mem-
ory does not fit so neatly into these categories. While it may be clear
that the perception phase of a repressed memory is similar to that of
a traditional memory, little is known about either the retention or
the retrieval stage. Questions such as where the memory is stored
and how it is eventually retrieved have no clear answers.
B. THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING REPRESSION
Although long afforded some recognition as a legitimate psy-
11 SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS 126 (1989).
12 Frawley, supra note 2, at 247-48.
13 Alison Bass, Researching Head Trauma and Amnesia: Brain Injury Usually Is the Cause
But Often the Victim Represses the Painful Memories, BOSTON GLOBE, July 9, 1990, at 27.
14 Irene Wielawski, Unlocking the Secrets of Memory: Recent Tales of Child Abuse Have a
Twist-Victims, Now Adults, Say Their Memories of the Horrors Were Repressed For Decades, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1991, at A26.
15 ELIZABETH LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 20-109 (1979).
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chological phenomenon, 16 repression and later retrieval of memory
are neither fully understood nor accepted. 17 Its existence is seem-
ingly substantiated by a number of clinical cases in which people,
often undergoing therapy, recall a memory of a previous traumatic
event. Occasionally these memories are claimed to be corroborated
from other sources, enhancing their credibility.' 8 Using these case
studies as their means of proof, therapists claim that the retrieval of
repressed memories is a very real experience. 19
Experimental psychologists and others, however, are not con-
vinced. Clinical case studies have been rejected as unconfirmed
speculations20 and a review of over sixty years of research failed to
turn up a single controlled laboratory experiment to support the
concept of repression. 21 Considering the severe trauma necessary
to induce repression, the kind that could not ethically be repro-
duced in an experimental setting, this may not be surprising. But
until experimental proof is available to demonstrate the existence of
repression, experimental psychologists will remain skeptical.
Much has been written about Freud's views on repression and
the recollections of childhood seduction, but the eruption from this
intellectual battleground merely clouds the picture. Some students
of Freud maintain that he at one time believed his women patients
when they talked about childhood seduction, but later came to the
view that the patients had deceived themselves. 22 Freud decided
that their previously repressed memories were nothing more than
fantasies based on the accuser's Oedipal desires for her father.23
While this understanding of Freud's views is a topic of some de-
16 Sigmund Freud used the term "repression" differently at different times, contrib-
uting to the great confusion about its meaning. In its most general sense repression is
simply the act of rejecting and keeping something out of consciousness. Matthew H.
Erdelyi & Benjamin Goldberg, Let's Not Sweep Repression Under the Rug: Toward a Cognitive
Psychology of Repression, in FUNCTIONAL DISORDERS OF MEMORY 355, 360 (J.F. Kihlstrom &
FJ. Evans eds., 1979). Lately, the concept of total or robust repression is being invoked
to explain how endless numbers of traumatic events spanning years of one's life can be
banished completely from awareness, leaving an individual who professes a relatively
happy childhood.
17 Wielawski, supra note 14, at Al.
18 See, e.g., Judith Herman & Emily Schatzow, Recovey and Verification of Memories of
Childhood Sexual Trauma, 4 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOL. 1, 10 (1987).
19 Darnton, supra note 2, at 70.
20 David Holmes, The Evidence for Repression: An Examination of Sixty Years of Research, in
REPRESSION AND DISSOCIATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONALITY, THEORY, PSYCHOPA-
THOLOGY AND HEALTH 85-102 (Jerome Singer ed., 1990).
21 Id.
22 JEFFREY M. MASSON, THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH (1984); Olio, supra note 3, at 97.
23 MASSON, supra note 22, at 54; Olio, supra note 3, at 97.
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bate,24 it underscores the fact that the authenticity of repressed and
subsequently recovered memories is not universally accepted.
C. REPRESSION OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE
It cannot be doubted that the experience of child sexual abuse
is particularly traumatic for the child-victim. Furthermore, it is
widely accepted by clinicians that the particulars of the trauma are
especially conducive to repression of memory of the incident. Thus,
in addition to the intense pain 25 or fright 26 that a child-victim of
rape or molestation may suffer, other factors are present which ex-
acerbate the trauma, leading to an increased likelihood of memory
repression.
The terror experienced by a victim of childhood sexual abuse is
often encouraged by the abuser; abusers frequently threaten their
young victims with grave consequences should the victim ever tell
anyone of the abusive incidents. "If you tell, I'll kill you," is terri-
fying yet believable to an already frightened child.27 Such threats
are common; 28 abusers realize that threats or coercion must evoke a
silencing terror if the abusers are to avoid legal and social repercus-
sions and continue to have sexual access to their victims. 29
Victims experience unresolvable confusion and guilt over activ-
ities which they do not understand. Abusers often compound these
feelings by claiming that the acts should be a "secret."30 Abusers
may intensify confusion and guilt by accusing the child of seductive
24 Defenders of Freud have argued that this claim represents a misreading of his
scholarly articles and a deliberate ignorance of changes in his own analytic practice.
Kenneth Silverman, Cruel and Usual Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb, 17, 1991, at 5 (review-
ing PHILIP GREVEN, SPARE THE CHILD (1991)).
25 Mary Doe recalled experiencing "searing, burning pain" as her father raped her.
Mithers, supra note 5, at 44.
26 See, e.g., DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (plaintiff
stated she had felt "great fear" during the abusive incidents); Evans v. Eckelman, 265
Cal. Rptr. 605, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (all three of the male plaintiffs experienced fear
of their alleged abuser).
27 Deborah Beraset Diamond, Awful Truths: Telling the World About Incest Hurts-And
Heals at the Same Time, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1991, at 3.
28 Id.;see also Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), appeal denied,
428 N.W.2d 552 (Wis. 1988) (plaintiff alleged that the abuse was accompanied by threats
of harm to her if she ever told anyone); E.W. and D.W. v. D.C.H., 754 P.2d 817 (Mont.
1988) (plaintiff alleged that defendant told her that great harm would befall her if she
told anyone).
29 Melissa Salten, Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the
Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 189, 196 (1984).
30 See, e.g., E. W. and D. W. v. D. C.H., 754 P.2d at 817 (plaintiff alleged that defendant
told her that the acts would be "our special secret"); Jones v.Jones, 576 A.2d 316, 318
(NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (the defendant allegedly repeatedly impressed upon the
plaintiff the need for secrecy); Mary D. v.John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633, 635 (Cal. Ct. App.
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behavior,3 ' or by blaming the child for some other wrong, and thus
justifying the abuse as a punishment.3 2
Furthermore, child-victims of sexual abuse often develop a
sense of helplessness. This helplessness results in part from an in-
ability to avoid or terminate the abusive situation. Dependent and
vulnerable children, in reality, have few mechanisms by which to
leave an abusive environment. Their dependency on the abuser,
which is often total, and the abuser's age, authority, or position
often make escape an impossibility.
Additionally, the helplessness of a child-victim is enhanced as a
result of being unable to seek any form of assistance. Informing a
third party of abuse presents insurmountable difficulties. First, the
child must recognize the wrongful nature of the conduct. This
alone is not an easy task; abusers often intimate that the abusive
actions are natural or normal.3 3 Additionally, given the status of the
abuser, who is often a parent or close relative,3 4 blaming the abuser
or recognizing the abuser as evil is psychologically threatening for a
dependent child.
Many child-victims, if they recognize that the conduct is wrong,
face the perceived threat of destruction of the family,3 5 a perception
often encouraged by the abuser.36 Alternatively, abusers warn their
victims not to tell because no one will believe them.3 7 For a depen-
dent and vulnerable child-victim, these threats can be overwhelming
and serve as an effective barrier against confiding in another person.
1989) (Mary D. alleged that her abuser gave her explicit directions never to tell anyone
about the acts).
31 LEONARD KARP & CHERYL KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL
ABUSE 187 (1989).
32 Hammer, 418 N.W.2d at 24 (plaintiff said she was told that she had caused the acts;
that it was her fault that she was being abused).
33 Comment, Not Enough Time?: The Constitutionality of Short Statutes of Limitations for
Civil Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 50 OHIO ST. LJ., 753, 757 (1989) (citing ANN BURGESS
ET AL., SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 86-87 (1978)). See also KARP &
KARP, supra note 3 1, at 187; Hammer, 418 N.W.2d at 25 (victim's father had told her that
the conduct was "normal and his right").
34 In one study of 583 cases of childhood sexual abuse, it was found that in 47% of
the cases the abuser was a family member, in 42% of the cases the abuser was an ac-
quaintance of the child, and in only 8% of the cases was the offender a stranger. Note,
Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 806, 807 n.14 (1985) (noted in Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986) (en
banc)). Of the cases in which the sexual abuse is within the family, 75% of the time the
contact is father-daughter or stepfather-stepdaughter. HENRY C. KEMPE & RAY E. HEL-
FER, THE BATTERED CHILD 204 (3d ed. 1980).
35 For an eloquent description of one case history, see CHARLOTrE V. ALLEN, DADDY'S
GIRL (1984).




A child-victim, traumatized, confused, unable to halt the abuse, and
unable to obtain external relief, naturally develops a sense of help-
lessness. Pain, fear, confusion, and guilt are internalized. To man-
age, the victim is led to a final coping mechanism, the denial of the
events and a repression of associated memories of the abusive
incidents.3S
Of course, not every case of child sexual abuse is alike and not
every case leads the child-victim into repression. Clinicians tend to
support the notion that the more egregious the abuse, the greater
the likelihood that a child will repress.3 9 Clinicians also believe that
children abused at an early age will be more likely to repress than
those abused at a later age.40 Additionally, abuse occurring in a par-
ticularly violent or intrusive manner, or that occurs over a long pe-
riod of time is more likely to lead a child to repress memory of the
abuse.4 1
Repression of memories of childhood sexual abuse has immedi-
ate coping advantages for a child-victim. By pretending that noth-
ing has happened, the victim can attempt to continue living a
"normal" life. Repression may, however, have serious and long-
term disadvantages. Psychiatrists and clinical psychologists have
suggested that repression of traumatic memories leads to difficulties
later in life, including severe depression, substance abuse, low self-
esteem, sexual and social dysfunction, and, occasionally, suicidal
tendencies. 42 These problems, similar to those exhibited by Mary
Doe, are some of the symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
("PTSD").4s
D. RETRIEVAL OF THE PREVIOUSLY REPRESSED MEMORY
A repressed memory, bringing short-term benefits but also
long-term problems, might not remain repressed throughout a vic-
tim's life. While many victims may never regain access to a "re-
pressed" traumatic event, others may have "repressed" memories
surface spontaneously, catching them totally by surprise. Other vic-
38 Olio, supra note 3, at 94.
39 STEVEN FARMER, ADULT CHILDREN OF ABUSIVE PARENTS 53-54 (1989); Kay Shafer,
Child Sexual Abuse and the Law, L.A. LAWYER, Sept. 1989, at 48.
40 Leonare Terr, What Happens to Early Memories of Trauma?: A Study of 22 Children
Under Age Five at the Time of Documented Traumatic Events, J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLES-
CENT PSYCHIATRY 96-104 (1988). This is true for other types of trauma as well, for exam-
ple death of a loved one or an accident, not just sexual abuse. Id.
41 Herman & Schatzow, supra note 18, at 2; Shafer, supra note 39, at 48.
42 Herman & Schatzow, supra note 18, at 2; Olio, supra note 3, at 93.
43 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS § 309.89 (3d rev. ed. 1987); Herman & Schatzow, supra note 18, at 2.
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tims may regain memory as a result of receiving therapy, counseling,
or other mental health services.
Therapists have a number of common beliefs about the return
of a repressed memory. The spontaneous resurfacing of a re-
pressed memory may occur as the result of a variety of triggering
mechanisms. Usually the triggering mechanism is somehow related
to the abuse. Thus, a television show on childhood sexual abuse,44
contact with an unrelated case of abuse,45 or experiencing a scene
similar to one associated with the repressed images46 can all trigger
the return of long repressed memories, according to this theory.
In other instances, repressed memories supposedly return as
"flashbacks," a reliving of a traumatic experience as if it were cur-
rently happening. 47 Flashbacks can be stimulated by normal life ex-
periences, especially milestones, such as marriage, birth of a baby,
or death. They can be evoked by sexual encounters, or even by
something as mundane as a particular laugh or certain expression.
Mercifully, repressed memories often wait patiently until the
survivor is in a "climate of safety," 48 often a therapist's company-a
safe and trusting spot.49 Victims of child sexual abuse are often lead
to therapy by the symptoms of PTSD. 50 Indeed, child sexual abuse
victims make up a comparatively large portion of those people seek-
ing mental health treatment. 51 The "treatment" itself may provide
the trigger to total recall of the repressed memory.
44 Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (adult survi-
vor's previously repressed memory of the sexual abuse she suffered as a child resurfaced
while watching a television program on victims of childhood sexual abuse).
45 Shari L. Karney, an attorney, was prosecuting a child-rapist when, in court, her
own memory of being sexually abused as a child began to flash back and eventually fully
resurfaced. Mithers, supra note 5, at 44, 53-58.
46 In 1989, Eileen Franklin-Lipsker suddenly remembered a brutal rape-murder her
father had committed on Eileen's best friend twenty years earlier. The event that trig-
gered the recall was a glance from Eileen's 6-year-old daughter which reminded the
mother of her childhood friend. Daughter's Words Bring 1969 Slaving Conviction, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1990, at 26 [hereinafter Daughter's Words].
47 E. SUE BLUME, SECRET SURVIVORS 100 (1990).
48 Id. at 101.
49 One therapist described a client in her twenties who did not recall a history of
abuse until she entered therapy, where she, in the environment of the therapist, began
to experience intrusive flashbacks of abuse by her grandfather. She progressed to a
semi-psychotic state in which she would go for periods of time not being able to distin-
guish between the flashback and the present world around her. She experienced rage,
terror, a near uncontrollable impulse to physically destroy things around her. She hallu-
cinated images of deceased relatives begging her to keep the sex abuse secret. Anti-
psychotic and antidepressant medications had to be prescribed. YVONNE M. DOLAN,
RESOLVING SEXUAL ABUSE 109 (1991).
50 Herman & Schatzow, supra note 18, at 1-3.
51 Id. at 2; Olio, supra note 3, at 93.
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Therapists often attempt to unlock repressed memories be-
cause they believe that in order to get well their patients must over-
come the protective denial which was used to tolerate the abuse
during childhood. 52 Memory-blocks can be protective in many
ways, but they come at a cost; they cut off the survivor from a signifi-
cant part of her past, and perhaps cause her negative self-image, low
self-esteem, and other mental problems.53 Therapists believe that
these memories must be brought into consciousness to help the sur-
vivor acknowledge reality and overcome denial processes that are
dysfunctional.54 In the words of one prolific psychoanalyst: "Total
memory recovery was total cure." 55
Just as anecdotes exist to support the opinion that repressed
memories may resurface later in life with clarity and certainty, so
other anecdotes exist to support the belief in the curative powers of
remembering. One thirty-eight year-old woman, Betsy, was hospi-
talized after a drunken rampage. 56 At intake she reported a history
of bulimia nervose, alcohol abuse, and self-mutilation during which
she would cut her forearms with a razor. She denied childhood sex
abuse. Over six months of therapy, during which she cut her arms
frequently, she began to dissociate, and, after repeated questioning,
began to "recall" her father pushing her to her knees to perform
oral sex on him. She also revealed that her father threatened to cut
her arms off if she ever told about the abuse. To her therapist, her
self-mutilation was now clearly an enactment of her past trauma. As
her abuse memories pushed their way through consciousness, she
gradually recovered and stopped her self-mutilation. In the words
of her therapist: "Regaining the memories of her childhood incest
and discussing them with another human being has improved this
woman's capacity of intimately knowing and relating to herself and
others." 57
III. CURRENT LAW AND THE SURVIVOR
The unlocking of repressed memories can leave a survivor with
a host of new problems; survivors must accept the veracity of the
memory and overcome a sense of guilt, shame, or self-blame. 58 For
52 SUSAN M. SGROI, 2 VULNERABLE POPULATIONS: SEXUAL ABUSE TREATMENT FOR
CHILDREN, ADULT SURVIVORS, OFFENDERS, AND PERSONS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 112
(1989); Herman & Schatzow, supra note 18, at 12.
53 Herman & Schatzow, supra note 18, at 12.
54 Id.; SGROI, supra note 52, at 115.
55 JEFFREY M. MASSON, FINAL ANALYSIS 12 (1990).
56 Frawley, supra note 2, at 255-56.
57 Id. at 256.
58 Hendrix, supra note 5, at El; Olio, supra note 3, at 97; Diamond, supra note 27, at 4.
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many survivors, therapy has apparently been useful in overcoming
some of these debilitating psychological responses. By uncovering
their past, they can understand the source of those responses.
A. THE LEGAL NEEDS OF SURVIVORS
Some survivors, however, have greater needs, including the
need to exert control in some fashion. They can do this by initiating
civil or criminal actions against their abuser.59 Mary Doe, for in-
stance, felt that her father had always been in power, and had always
controlled and manipulated the family.60 To escape from that
power, Mary felt she had to stand up to him and hold him accounta-
ble for his actions. Mary needed society in general, and the court
system in particular, to pronounce her father guilty in order to be
free of him once and for all.
Many abusers refuse to admit the wrongfulness of their conduct
or to appreciate its devastating results.6' The denying abusers con-
tinue to blame their victims for any disruption and disgrace brought
to the family as well as for any social or psychological problems the
victim may have. 62 These adult survivors, then, often turn to the
court system for judgment, to force accountability onto the abuser,
and to allow the survivor to finally free herself of guilt or self-
doubt.
6 3
In addition to personal relief as a reason for bringing legal ac-
tions, many survivors say their motive is societal good. Mary Doe
saw her suit as helping other victims, in part by increasing their
awareness of their legal options. 64 These survivors believe that civil
and criminal actions constitute more ways to demonstrate that child
sexual abuse is not acceptable, and to increase awareness of the
59 Some therapists encourage their patients to sue as "hope for emotional justice."
One argument advanced by a therapist who had treated more than 1500 incest victims is
that the lawsuit, however grueling, is "a very important step towards devictimization ...
a further source of validation. The personal satisfaction can be significant." SUSAN FOR-
WARD & CRAIG BUCK, BETRAYAL OF INNOCENCE: INCEST AND ITS DEVASTATION 159 (1988).
60 Hendrix, supra note 5, at El, E17.
61 See Nathan L. Pollock &Judith M. Hashmall, The Excuses of Child Molesters, 9 BEHAV-
IORAL SCI. & L. 53-60 (1991).
62 See, e.g., Herman & Schatzow, supra note 18, at 10; Hammer v. Hammer, 418
N.W.2d 23, 24-25 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (defendant told plaintiff "she was at fault for her
problems and the family's problems").
63 One survivor, after receiving a favorable judgment in a similar case, expressed his
relief: "Just to see his name in the papers and to hear the guilty verdict, I feel good. My
life has some meaning. I know that what he did to me wasn't my fault. After 18 years, I
feel that justice can still be done." Alexander Reid, Ruling Ignores Statutes of Limitations on
Abuse Cases, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 4, 1991, § 3 at 21, 31.
64 Hendrix, supra note 5, at El, E17.
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long-term damage childhood sexual abuse inflicts. 65 Moreover,
legal actions serve as a warning to would-be child molesters that
they will not get away with sexually abusing children, that society is
ready and willing to hold them accountable for their actions no mat-
ter how long ago the abusive incidents occurred. 66 Finally, any
monetary award accompanying a successful civil suit is often desper-
ately needed by the victim who has possibly faced years of social
dysfunction and expensive counseling.67
B. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
If an adult survivor makes the decision to file a civil or criminal
charge against the abuser, a major obstacle arises: the statute of
limitations. These statutes provide that no legal action can be main-
tained unless brought within a specified period of time, and, in cases
of repressed memory, the victim is often unaware of the wrongful
event until well after the statute of limitations has expired.68 While
this may seem unfair or unjust on the surface, statutes of limitations
were developed to prevent unjustices, not to further them.
Statutes of limitations evolved over time with definite purposes
in mind. They protect people from being forced to defend them-
selves against stale claims.69 The statutes recognize that with the
passage of time, evidence becomes more difficult to obtain and is
less reliable. 70 Physical evidence is lost or destroyed, witnesses be-
come impossible to locate, and memories fade.7 1 With passing time,
a defendant faces an increasingly difficult task in formulating and
mounting an effective defense. 72 Additionally, statutes of limita-
tions encourage plaintiffs to initiate actions promptly while evidence
is fresh and a court will be able to judge more accurately.
65 Id.
66 Mithers, supra note 5, at 44, 58.
67 See, e.g., Hendrix, supra note 5, at El, El 7 (one of the reasons to sue is the money,
for the survivor of child sexual abuse wasted years of her life and needed extensive
therapy).
68 The statute of limitations for child abuse cases varies a great deal from state to
state. Commonly, victims are allowed one to three years after reaching the age of major-
ity before the statute of limitations expires on a civil action. See Martha Jean Zackin,
Note, The Discovery Rule and Father-Daughter Incest: A Legislative Response, 29 B.C. L. REV.
941 (1988); Alan Rosenfeld, The Statute of Limitations Barier in Childhood Sexual.4buse Cases:
The Equitable Estoppel Remedy, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 206 (1989).
69 Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 227 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).





C. CIVIL SUITS, STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, AND THE DELAYED
DISCOVERY DOCTRINE
Statutory time bars on the filing of civil suits, however, do have
exceptions. In some cases, plaintiffs do not know when a wrong has
occurred and may not discover their cause of action until years after
the statute of limitations has expired. In response to such cases,
courts fashioned the "delayed discovery doctrine" to prevent the in-
justice which would result from the strict application of the statute
of limitations. 73
A commonly used definition of the delayed discovery doctrine
states that "the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
plaintiff has discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, all of the facts which are essential to the
cause of action."'7 4 This doctrine balances the unfairness faced by a
plaintiff who is deprived of a verdict against the harm suffered by
the defendant in letting the case go to trial after a long delay. Its
purpose is to prevent the injustice which would result from the lit-
eral application of the statute of limitations in some cases.7 5 Thus,
"fundamental fairness is the linchpin" of the discovery doctrine.7 6
A traditional application of this doctrine has been in cases of
medical malpractice: the patient discovers that her abdominal dis-
comfort is caused by a surgical instrument left in her abdominal cav-
ity after an appendectomy performed twenty-two years previously. 77
In such cases, courts find that the application of the balancing test
73 Id. at 229.
74 DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). See also Lindabury v.
Lindabury, 552 So. 2d 1117, 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (Jorgenson, J., dissenting)
("where the plaintiff's ignorance is blameless, the cause of action will not arise until the
plaintiff knows or is chargeable with knowing of an invasion of his legal right") (quoting
Senfeld v. Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Co., 450 So. 2d 1157, 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984)); Tyson, 727 P.2d at 227 ("a statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
plaintiff, using reasonable diligence, would have discovered the cause of action"); John-
son v.Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (the statute of limitations com-
mences "when the plaintiff knew or should have known that he was injured") (quoting
Lincoln-Way Community Villages v. Village of Frankfort, 367 N.E.2d 318, 323-24 (Ill.
App. 1977)); Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Wis. App. 1987) ("the cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, both that s/he is injured and that the injury was caused by the
defendant's misconduct") (quoting Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits:
Preserving the Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 189, 213 (1984)); Osland v. Osland,
442 N.W.2d 907, 909 (N.D. 1989) ("the discovery rule.., tolls the statute of limitations
until the plaintiff knows, or with reasonable diligence should know, that a potential claim
exists") (citing Wall v. Lewis, 393 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1986)).
75 Tyson, 727 P.2d at 231 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
76 Id. (Pearson, J., dissenting).
77 See, e.g., Ruth v. Dight, 453 P.2d 631 (Wash. 1969).
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required by the delayed discovery doctrine clearly strikes in favor of
the patient.78 Since the patient could not know that a surgical in-
strument had been negligently left in her abdomen until exploratory
surgery found it after twenty-two years of discomfort, the harm of
depriving her of a remedy outweighs the harm to the surgeon who
must defend an operation conducted twenty-two years earlier. 79
The discovery doctrine can similarly be applied to cases in
which survivors of childhood sexual abuse have repressed all mem-
ory of the tortuous conduct. Thus, as the surgical instrument is hid-
den from the patient until a future event uncovers it, memory is
hidden away until it, too, is discovered and the survivor possesses
"all the facts which are essential to the cause of action." 80 When
applying the doctrine in cases of previously repressed memories of
childhood sexual abuse, courts must balance the harm of denying a
remedy to a plaintiff who had no access to her memory against the
hardships faced by a defendant defending against such longstanding
claims.
1. Judicial Response in Civil Cases of Childhood Sexual Abuse
The first cases in which survivors of childhood sexual abuse ar-
gued for the application of the delayed discovery rule were unsuc-
cessful. 8 ' Typical of these cases is Tyson v. Tyson.82 In that case, the
plaintiff, Nancy Tyson, accused her father of multiple acts of sexual
assault occurring over a nine-year period, when she was between
three and eleven years old.8 3 Her complaint alleged that as a result
of the trauma she experienced, she repressed all memories of the
incidents until she entered therapy fifteen years later.8 4
The court, however, refused to use the delayed discovery doc-
trine to toll the statute of limitations. 85 The court expressed con-
cern about the length of time which had elapsed since the alleged
abusive events, and about the lack of "objective, verifiable evi-
dence." 8 6 The court also thought that a substantial risk of stale
claims would result from allowing repressed memories to toll the
78 Id. at 635-36.
79 Id.
80 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
81 Newlander v. Newlander, No. B003156 (Cal. Ct. App. filed Jan. 9, 1984) (cited in
Salten, supra note 29, at 203-06); Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986).
82 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986).
83 Id. at 227.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 230.
86 Id. at 228.
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statute of limitations.8 7 Thus, in holding in favor of the defendant,
the court found that the right of the defendant not to be forced to
defend against a stale claim was superior to the right of the plaintiff
to present her case.88
In recent years, however, arguments in favor of applying the
discovery rule to cases of repressed memories of childhood sexual
abuse have been more successful. Mary Doe and several other
plaintiffs have succeeded in bringing suits that require the tolling of
the statute of limitations by application of the discovery rule.8 9 As
much as twenty years had passed since the abusive incidents,90 and
yet the courts held that justice demanded that the statute of limita-
tions be tolled by the repression of memory of the abuse. The
courts in these cases examined the circumstances surrounding the
sexual abuse of children, presumed the possible validity of a re-
pressed memory, and found that to bar the plaintiffs' opportunity to
bring a suit would be "most unfair." 9 1 Although the application of
the discovery rule to cases of repressed memories has not been
unanimous, 92 the trend is definitely toward the acceptance of the
87 Id. at 230.
88 The Tyson court was deeply divided. The decision was 5-4, with Justices Durham,
Dore, Anderson, Callow and Goodloe voting with the majority, and ChiefJustice Dol-
liver and Justices Utter, Brachenbach, and Pearson dissenting. Additionally, a number
of commentators criticized the holding almost immediately after it was issued. See Mark
D. Kamitomo, Note, Discovery Rule Application in Child Abuse Actions, 23 GONZ. L. REV. 223
(1988); Naomi Berkowitz, Note, Balancing the Statute of Limitations and Discovery Rule: Some
Victims of Incestuous Abuse Are Denied Access to Washington Courts-Tyson v. Tyson, 10 U. Pu-
GET SOUND L. REV. 721 (1987).
89 Four cases have been brought with fact patterns very similar to those of the fic-
tional Mary Doe, including the real Mary's case: Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989), remanded 275 Cal. Rptr. 380 (Cal. 1990);Johnson v.Johnson, 701
F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Evans v. Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990); Doe v. LaBrosse, 588 A.2d 605 (R.I. 1991). Additionally, three cases have arisen
with somewhat similar fact patterns: although a victim of child sexual abuse did not
repress the memory of the abuse, the victim was unaware of the causal relationship be-
tween the abuse and present mental and emotional difficulties. In these cases the courts
tolled the statute of limitations in holdings broad enough to encompass a case similar to
Mary Doe's. See Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. App. 1987); Osland v. Os-
land, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.
1986) (under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the statute of limitations does not begin to
run until the victim learns that the abusive conduct caused her emotional injuries).
9 OJohnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
91 Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
92 See Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986); Lindaburg v. Lindaburg, 552 So.
2d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the statute of limitations had run);
Burpee v. Burpee, 578 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). The Lindaburg court failed
to even discuss the discovery rule in a half-page opinion that demonstrates great short-
sightedness by the court, which would not even agree to toll the statute of limitations
until the victim reached the age of majority.
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discovery rule for survivors such as Mary Doe.93
2. Legislative Reaction
After failing in the courts, some plaintiffs' civil attorneys took
their efforts to legislative arenas. There, legislative bodies of a
number of states were impressed by arguments that the law should
not protect perpetrators who successfully traumatize their victims
into repression, and that survivors of childhood sexual abuse de-
serve a tolling of the statute of limitations during the period that
their memory has been repressed. The first legislation to apply the
discovery doctrine to civil cases of childhood sexual abuse was en-
acted in Washington in 1989.9 4 This statute states:
All claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct brought by
any person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of
childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced within the later of the
following periods: (a) Within three years of the time of the act alleged
to have caused the injury or condition; (b) Within three years of the
time the victim discovered or reasonably should have discovered that
the injury or condition was caused by said act; or (c) Within three years
of the time the victim discovered that the act caused the injury for
which the claim is brought.95
Since the passing of the Washington law, at least twenty other
states have enacted similar legislation allowing for the tolling of the
statute of limitations in civil cases. 96 In addition, other states have
93 A number of states that do not recognize the delayed discovery doctrine have at-
tempted to apply other equitable doctrines to allow victims of childhood sexual abuse
with previously repressed memories into court. Primarily, plaintiffs have attempted to
argue that the repression of memory by a plaintiff places the plaintiff in an "insanity"
exception which also tolls the statute of limitations. While this argument is occasionally
used successfully, see, e.g., Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988); Jones v. Jones, 576 A.2d 316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), it has been re-
jected in numerous other jurisdictions, see, e.g., Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578
(Utah App. 1990); Strata v. Patin, 545 So. 2d 1180 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Smith v. Smith,
830 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1987); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 556 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990).
94 The legislation was largely instigated by Patti Barton, a survivor of childhood sex-
ual abuse, who attempted to bring suit against her abuser in a Washington State court.
After she learned that Tyson prevented her from bringing a suit, she successfully lobbied
to get the statute enacted. Since that time, she and her husband have lobbied every state
in the nation to enact similar laws, and it is largely through their efforts that similar
statutes have been adopted by 20 other states. See infra note 96.
95 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West 1992).
96 The states that have adopted legislation tolling the statute of limitations for civil
suits alleging childhood sexual abuse are: Alaska (claims for sexual abuse may be
brought within three years after discovery), ALASKA STAT. § 9.10.140(b)(I)-(2) (Supp.
1992); California (civil actions for childhood sexual abuse may be commenced within
three years after the date of discovery); Arkansas (three year statute of limitations begins
at date of discovery), S.B. 287, 79th Gen. Assembly, 1993 Sess. (enacted Mar. 5, 1993);
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considered, or are currently considering, bills that would achieve
the same result,97 and law-makers from many other states are study-
ing similar legislation for introduction in future legislative sessions.
While most states enacting legislation to toll the statute of limi-
tations in cases of childhood sexual abuse have modeled their legis-
lation after Washington's statute, several are even more liberal. For
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West Supp. 1993); Colorado (civil actions for childhood
sexual abuse must be brought within six years of discovery), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-80-103.7 (West Supp. 1992); Connecticut (action must be brought no later than 17
years from the date the person attains the age of majority), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
577d (West 1991); Florida (action founded on childhood sexual abuse may be brought
within four years of the time of discovery), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(7) (West Supp.
1993); Idaho (action for childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within five years of
the child reaching 18 years of age), IDAHO CODE § 6-1704 (1989); Iowa (childhood sex-
ual abuse actions must be brought within four years of their discovery), IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 614.8A (West Supp. 1993); Kansas (action for childhood sexual abuse may be brought
within three years of discovery), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-523 (Supp. 1992); Maine (child-
hood sexual abuse actions may be brought up to six years after the victim discovers the
harm), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-C (West Supp. 1992); Minnesota (child victims
of sexual abuse may file complaints within three years after the offense was reported to
law enforcement authorities), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.26 (West Supp. 1993); Missouri
(victims of childhood sexual abuse may file civil suits within three years of the date of
discovery), Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.046 (Supp. 1991); Montana (childhood sexual abuse
suit may be brought within three years of the date of discovery), MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-
2-216(1)(b) (1991); Nevada (childhood sexual abuse suits may be brought within three
years of discovery), NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.215 (Supp. 1991); New Mexico (childhood sex-
ual abuse actions must be brought within three years of discovery), N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 37-1-30 (Michie Supp. 1993); Oregon (childhood sexual abuse suits are allowed to be
brought for three years after the date of discovery but not after the victim is 40 years
old), OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117 (1991); Rhode Island (action for childhood sexual abuse
may be brought within three years of discovery), R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-51 (Supp. 1992);
South Dakota (childhood sexual abuse suits may be brought up to three years after date
of discovery), S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 26-10-25 (1992); Vermont (childhood sexual
abuse suits may be brought within six years of discovery), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522
(Supp. 1992); Virginia (cause of action accrues on the date which sexual abuse is discov-
ered, but no action may be brought later than 10 years after the victim reaches the age of
majority), VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249(6) (Michie 1992). One additional state, New
Hampshire, already had a statute of limitations that incorporated the delayed discovery
doctrine for all civil cases. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.4 (Supp. 1992).
97 States considering such legislation include: Hawaii, H.B. 2606, 16th Leg., 1992
Sess. (1991) (childhood sexual abuse actions may be brought within two years of discov-
ery); Illinois, H.B. 1335, 88th Gen. Assembly, 1993-94 Sess. (1993) (abolishes statute of
limitations for actions based on childhood sexual abuse); Massachusetts, H.B. 915,
178th Gen. Court, 1993 Sess. (actions for childhood sexual abuse must be commenced
within three years of discovery); Michigan, H.B. 4518, 87th Leg., 1993 Sess. (actions for
childhood sexual abuse must be brought within three years of discovery); Nebraska, L.R.
176, 93d Leg., 1st Sess. (1993) (considering changes to statute of limitations); New
York, A.B. 7695, 215th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1993) (actions based on childhood
sexual abuse must be commenced within three years of discovery); Ohio, H.B. 271,
119th Gen. Assembly, 1991-92 Sess. (1991) (actions for childhood sexual abuse must be
brought within four years of discovery); South Carolina, H.B. 3927, Statewide Sess.
(1993) (actions must be brought within 12 years of victim's 18th birthday or four years
from date of discovery).
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example, Illinois recently enacted a statute abolishing the statute of
limitations entirely for actions arising from childhood sexual
abuse.98 Virginia added a novel one-year window, during which vic-
tims of childhood sexual abuse who were previously barred under
the prior statute of limitations could bring suit against their alleged
abuser, to supplement that state's tolling of the statute of limitations
until discovery. 99
When the numbers are added up, at least twenty-one states al-
low the statute of limitations to be tolled in civil cases where a victim
of child sexual abuse has repressed all memory of the incident. 100
These numbers are especially remarkable since as late as 1986 no
states allowed such cases. The magnitude of the movement to allow
repressed memories to toll the statute of limitations is even more
apparent when one additionally considers the large number of states
which are considering adopting similar laws. It is, then, indisputa-
ble that repression as a basis for tolling the statute of limitations will
soon be quite common, at least in civil cases concerning child sexual
abuse.
D. CRIMINAL ACTIONS AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The criminal statutes of limitations for child sexual abuse differ
from state to state and differ widely, from states like South Carolina
and Wyoming, which have no statutes of limitations for any criminal
offenses, to Hawaii, which has a three year statute of limitations for
rape of a child, regardless of the age and ability of the victim to
report the crime. 101 Obviously, in states such as South Carolina and
Wyoming, survivors of childhood sexual abuse will not face statute
of limitations problems in bringing criminal charges against their
abusers even much later in life. Traditionally, however, statutes of
limitations were more likely to read like those of Hawaii, and allow
for criminal charges to be filed only during a fixed time after the
actual criminal event. Therefore, many survivors wishing to initiate
criminal proceedings against their abusers face the potential prob-
lem of a statute of limitations that has run its course.
Furthermore, criminal statutes of limitations are often rigidly
drawn, and the judicially created "delayed discovery" doctrine does
98 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (Supp. 1993).
99 1991 Va. Acts 674 (no claims for childhood sexual abuse "which occurred prior to
July 1, 1991, shall be barred ... if it is filed within one year of the date of this act").
100 Nineteen states have enacted statutes to allow these actions. See supra note 96 and
accompanying text. In two additional states, judges have tolled the statute of limitations
and allowed such suits to go forward. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
101 HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-108(2)(b) (1985).
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not extend to criminal proceedings. The limitation of the delayed
discovery doctrine to civil actions has several justifications. First,
the very origins of the doctrine focus on the civil plaintiff. Using the
delayed discovery to toll a statute of limitations prevents an injustice
from occurring at the expense of an innocently ignorant plaintiff.
This is balanced against the hardship faced by a potential defendant,
and, in the civil context, courts have found that in limited cases the
application of the discovery doctrine is necessary for justice.
In criminal actions, on the other hand, the focus is on the rights
of the potential defendant with the courts recognizing that a crimi-
nal charge portends far greater consequences than a civil charge.
The purpose of criminal statutes of limitations is to limit potential
criminal prosecution to a fixed period after the occurrence of the
criminal acts10 2 in order that a case may be heard while the evidence
is fresh and to give the court the greatest chance of reaching a cor-
rect verdict. Statutes of limitations also prevent prosecution of peo-
ple who committed a crime in the past, but have been law abiding
for years, allowing a one-time criminal peace of mind years later
knowing he or 9he is free from the threat of prosecution or black-
mail.' 0 3 Furthermore, such statutes of limitations encourage law en-
forcement agencies to proceed in a timely manner as to avoid delay
which may be harmful to an accused person's attempt to mount a
defense. Thus, according to the United States Supreme Court,
criminal statutes of limitations "normally begin to run when the
crime is complete" and are to be "liberally interpreted in favor of
repose."'' 0 4 The result of these rulings is that unless there is a statu-
tory provision providing otherwise, criminal time limits are given
strict statutory construction.
1. Judicial Response to Criminal Complaints of Childhood Sexual Abuse
and Statutes of Limitations
Regardless of the strict language of the Supreme Court man-
dating interpretation of statutes of limitations in favor of criminal
defendants, a few courts, with prosecutorial urging, have fashioned
opinions that allow the tolling of criminal statutes of limitations in
specific circumstances. The theories most often urged upon the
courts by prosecutors are the "continuing crime" and "conceal-
ment" theories.
The "continuing crime" theory uses a simple premise that a
102 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114 (1970).
103 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 802 (2d ed. 1992).
104 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115 (quoting Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 418
(1943) and United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932)).
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crime is not complete as long as the defendant continues to engage
in the criminal conduct, and, as long as the crime is not complete,
the statute of limitations does not begin to run. This argument has
been used successfully to extend the statue of limitations for crimi-
nal abuse of a child, 105 but its application is limited to those situa-
tions where some element of the crime continues for years,106 and
indeed it is only invoked if that element of the crime continues until
after the traditional statute of limitations has expired. Most often,
in child sexual abuse cases, that element is the perpetrator's contin-
uing abuse of his authoritative position. Repressed memory cases,
surfacing years after the completion of the abuse, will seldom con-
tain such a continuing element.
The "concealment" argument is based upon statutory provi-
sions in a number of states that allow for the tolling of the statute of
limitations if the perpetrator conceals his crime.107 Concealment
provisions, when applied to cases involving childhood sexual abuse,
have met with limited success.108 These provisions, however, are
105 See State v. Danielski, 348 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (an element of the
sexual offense is the defendant's exertion of authority over the victim and the crime
continued until that exertion of authority ceased, even though the abuse had ceased
previously).
106 See State v. Shamp, 422 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds,
427 N.W.2d 228 (Minn. 1988) (court held that since victim and defendant did not live in
the same house and did not have day-to-day contact, there was no continuing unlawful
crime with which to toll the statute of limitations); State v. French, 392 N.W.2d 596
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (court held that since uncle who abused victim did not control her
day-to-day activities there was no continuing unlawful activity and the statute of limita-
tions did not toll).
107 The law of Indiana is an example of the type of statutory provision designed to toll
the statute of limitations when concealment of a crime occurs: "The period within which
a prosecution must be commenced does not include any period in which: . . . the ac-
cused person conceals evidence of the offense, and evidence sufficient to charge him
with that offense is unknown to the prosecuting authority and could not have been dis-
covered by that authority by exercise of due diligence...." IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-4-
2(d) (Burns 1986).
108 See Crider v. State, 531 N.E.2d 1151 (Ind. 1988) (threats of physical violence
against victim can constitute concealment of a crime for the purposes of tolling the stat-
ute of limitations); Walstrom v. State, 752 P.2d 225 (Nev. 1988) (the methods used to
perpetrate and hide the crime of child sex abuse resulted in concealment of that crime
and served to toll the statute of limitations). But see State v. Davidson, 816 S.W.2d 316
(Tenn. 199 1) (defendant's coercion of the victim not to tell anyone of the abuse held not
concealment of a crime and therefore statute of limitations not tolled); Umfleet v. State,
556 N.E.2d 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (statute of limitations not tolled under the conceal-
ment provision -where defendant made no positive actions such as threats to conceal the
sexual abuse of his daughter); Tidwell v. State, 775 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1989) (defendant found not to have concealed crime since victims were aware of it);
State v. Bently, 721 P.2d 227 (Kan. 1986) (defendant's threats to victim not to tell any-
one of the abuse held not to constitute concealment of the offense and thus the statute
of limitations had not tolled).
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usually narrowly construed since attempts at concealment are com-
monplace' 0 9 and courts usually require a positive act to conceal the
fact that a crime has been committed. The judiciary has taken two
differing paths when faced with this argument. One response is that
a crime against a person, by its very nature, cannot be considered
concealed.1 0 The other response is more sympathetic to the pecu-
liarities involved with child sexual abuse and recognizes that the
threats, coercion, and manipulation often invoked can in fact con-
ceal the crime and thus serve to toll the statute of limitations."'
Despite these arguments, relatively few criminal child sex abuse
cases exist in which either argument has successfully tolled the stat-
ute of limitations. Neither of the arguments has received anything
like the almost universal acceptance that the delayed discovery doc-
trine enjoys in the civil context. Given these limitations in judicially
created solutions, advocates desiring extended criminal statutes of
limitations for child sexual abuse have successfully turned to the
law-making bodies for help.
2. Legislative Response To Criminal Complaints of Childhood Sexual
Abuse and Statutes of Limitations
Legislative change from the traditional fixed-time statute of lim-
itations for criminal child sexual abuse is occurring at a rapid
pace. 112 Only five states remain that do not have statutory tolling or
extension provisions for childhood sexual abuses cases; thus, in
these states, the statute of limitations begins to run immediately af-
ter the abuse is complete regardless of the age of the victim, the
inability of the victim to report the crime, or the possible repression
of the memory of the crime." 13
The majority of states, however, have recognized and re-
109 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 103, at 802.
110 See, e.g., Bently, 721 P.2d at 230 ("crimes against persons, by their very nature,
cannot be concealed").
''' See, e.g., Crider, 531 N.E.2d at 1154 (defendant "successfully concealed the fact of
his crimes by his positive acts of intimidation of his victims").
112 In a 1990 article, it was reported that 24 states did not have any provisions to toll
criminal statutes of limitations in cases of childhood sexual abuse. Jessica Mindlin, Child
Sexual Abuse and Criminal Statutes of Limitation: A Model For Reform, 65 WASH. L. REv. 189,
191 n.12 (1990). Current research indicates that only five states have no provisions to
either toll or extend the statute of limitations in cases of childhood sexual abuse. See
infra note 113.
113 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-193(a) (West Supp. 1993) (five year statute of
limitations); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 205(e) (Supp. 1992) (five year statute of limita-
tions); HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-108 (Supp. 1992) (six year statute of limitations); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10 (McKinney 1992) (five year statute of limitations); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 12.01 (West Supp. 1993) (ten year statute of limitations).
150 [Vol. 84
MEMORY REPRESSION
sponded to what some perceive as injustice in the relatively short
criminal statute of limitations for child sexual abuse.1 4 These legis-
lative responses are varied. An approach adopted by a number of
states is to simply extend the statute of limitations in cases of child
sexual abuse. 115 Thus in Mississippi, for example, the normal fel-
ony statute of limitations is two years, but in the case of a sex crime
committed against a minor, the limitations period is extended until
on or before the victim's twenty-first birthday." 6
Most states, however, responding to the problem of a minor
victim being unable or unwilling to come forward (or coming for-
ward only to be met by disbelief) have enacted tolling statutes." 17
114 Two states, South Carolina and Wyoming, do not impose statutes of limitations on
any crimes, and seven other states do not have statutes of limitations for felonies. See
ALA. CODE § 15-3-5(a)(4) (Supp. 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.050 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1990); MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN., § 5-106 (Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-1 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-21-2 (1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-8 (Michie Supp.
1993); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-9 (1992).
115 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-401(7) (Supp. 1993) (if the victim is under the age of 15,
the statute of limitations increases from three years to ten years); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
41-4-2(c) (Bums Supp. 1993) (prosecution must be commenced before victim's thirty-
first birthday); IOWA CODE ANN. § 802.2 (West Supp. 1993) (if the victim is under the age
of 12, the statute of limitations is extended to the victim's 18th birthday plus six
months); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3106 (Supp. 1992) (if the victim is under 16, the statute
of limitations is extended from two years to five years); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-1-5
(Supp. 1993) (if the victim is under the age of 21, the statute of limitations is extended
until on or before the victim's 21st birthday); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 556.037 (Vernon Supp.
1993) (if victim is under 17 years old, the statute of limitations is extended to ten years);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-110(2) (Supp. 1992) (if victim is under 16 years old, the statute of
limitations is extended until seven years from the date of the crime or after the victim's
16th birthday, whichever is longer); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 22-22-7 (Supp. 1993) (if
the victim is under the age of 16, the statute of limitations is increased to seven years or
is extended until the victim reaches the age of 19, whichever is longer); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-2-101(d) (1990) (the statute of limitations is increased to four years or is ex-
tended until the victim reaches the age of majority, whichever is longer); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 939.74(2)(c) (West Supp. 1992) (statute of limitations is either six years or ex-
tended until the victim reaches the age of 2 1, whichever is longer).
116 MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-1-5.
117 See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-1-109(h) (Michie Supp. 1991) (tolls the statute of limita-
tions until the victim is 18); CAL. PENAL CODE § 803(f) (West 1993) (if victim is under
age 17, the statute of limitations is extended until the victim's 17th birthday or to within
one year of reporting, whichever is later); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.15(7) (West 1992) (if
the victim is under 16 years old, statute of limitations is tolled until the victim is 16 years
old or until the crime is reported, whichever occurs first); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-3-2.1
(Michie Supp. 1993) (tolls the statute of limitations until the victim reaches 16 years of
age); IDAHO CODE § 19-402 (Supp. 1992) (tolls the statute of limitations until the victim
is 18 years old); 720 ILCS 5/3-6(c),(d) (1993) (actions may be commenced within one
year of victim's 18th birthday or within three years of date of offense); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 573(4) (West Supp. 1993) (if the victim is under 17, the statute of limita-
tions is tolled until the victim turns 17); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 277, § 63 (West
Supp. 1993) (if the victim is under 16, the statute of limitations is tolled until the victim
reaches the age of 16, or reports the crime to a law enforcement agency, whichever is
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Typically the statute of limitations is tolled until the minor reaches a
certain age, usually that state's age of majority. The law of Massa-
chusetts exemplifies this type of statute:
Notwithstanding the foregoing, if a victim of a [sex crime] is under the
age of sixteen at the time such crime is committed, the period of limi-
tation for prosecution shall not commence until the victim has reached
the age of sixteen or the violation is reported to a law enforcement
agency, whichever occurs earlier. 11 8
Some of these tolling statues extend the statute of limitations in
addition to tolling its initiation until the victim reaches the age of
majority. For example, in New Hampshire, if the victim of a sex
crime is under the age of eighteen, the statute of limitations is tolled
until the victim turns eighteen, and then the victim has twenty-two
years to report the crime before the statute of limitations runs
out. 19 Thus, a person could conceivably have until the age of
thirty-nine or forty to initiate criminal charges for a sex crime that
occurred, say, thirty-five years earlier.
All of these legislative responses, however, have one point in
common: they include a fixed period after which criminal actions
may not be brought. These statutes then, may not reach a case
based upon a repressed memory that resurfaces years later, when
the victim is in her thirties, forties, and beyond (except in rare cases,
as in New Hampshire).
Seven state legislatures have enacted laws that go further than
sooner); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 767.24 (West Supp. 1992) (indictment may be
brought within six years of offense or by the victim's 21 st birthday, whichever is later);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-1-205(I)(b) (1991) (if victim is less than 18 years old, the statute
of limitations is tolled until the victim turns 18); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.095 (Michie
1993) (statute of limitations is tolled until the victim's 21st birthday if injury is discov-
ered prior to victim's 21st birthday or else until victim's 28th birthday); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 625:8 (Supp. 1992) (if the victim is under the age of 18, the statute of limitations
is tolled until the victim is 18 and then the statute of limitations extends for 22 years);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-6-b(4) (West Supp. 1992) (if the victim is under 18, the five year
statute of limitations is tolled until the victim reaches 18); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-9.1
(Michie 1992) (tolls the statute of limitations until the victim turns 18 or reports the
crime, whichever occurs first); OR. REv. STAr. § 131.125(2) (1991) (if the victim is less
than 18 years old, the six year statute of limitations begins either when the victim
reaches age 18 or when the crime is reported, whichever occurs first); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
42, § 5554(3) (Supp. 1993) (if the victim is under 18 years old, tolls the statute of limita-
tions until the victim's 18th birthday); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4501 (Supp. 1992) (for
victims under age 17, the six year statute of limitations is tolled until the victim reaches
the age of 24 or untiil the crime is reported, whichever is earlier); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.04.080(1)(c)(i) (West Supp. 1993) (if victim is under age 14, the statute of
limitations is tolled until the child reaches age 18 or until seven years after the offense,
whichever is later).
118 MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 277, § 63.
119 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:8.
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the toll-until-age-of-majority limitations statutes and reach most, if
not all, repressed memory cases. 120 Alaska and Maine have re-
moved the statute of limitations altogether for child sexual abuse
when the victim is a minor.121 The other five states, Arizona, Ohio,
North Dakota, Utah, and Oklahoma, codify the delayed discovery
doctrine into their criminal statute of limitations for childhood sex-
ual abuse. Arizona's law, for example, reads: "[P]rosecutions [for
felony sexual abuse of a child] must be commenced within [seven
years] after actual discovery by the state or the political subdivision
having jurisdiction of the offense or discovery by the state or such
political subdivision which should have occurred with the exercise of
reasonable diligence, whichever first occurs." 122
Such laws go even beyond the delayed discovery doctrine as
employed in civil cases. These statutes of limitations, unlike the
delayed discovery doctrine, do not focus on the victim having dis-
covered a previously repressed crime. Rather, these statutes focus
on when the crime is reported, or when law enforcement officials
should have discovered the crime. Thus, even if a victim is con-
sciously aware of the abuse but chooses not to report it for twenty,
thirty or more years, the statute of limitations will not have run.
And certainly if a repressed memory resurfaces at anytime during
the victim's lifetime, it can be used as the basis for criminal charges.
120 ALAsKA STAT. § 12.10.020 (Supp. 1992) (action for offense committed against a
person under age 18 may be commenced anytime); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-107(B)
(1989) (tolls the statute of limitations until actual discovery of the crime by law enforce-
ment officials or to the time when the law enforcement officials, using reasonable dili-
gence, should have discovered the crime); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 8 (West
Supp. 1992) (if the victim is under 16 years of age, there is no statute of limitations on
the filing of criminal charges); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-04-03.1 (Supp. 1993) (if the victim
is under 18, the statute of limitations is tolled for seven years, or within three years of
reporting of the offense, whichever is later); OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.13(F) (Bald-
win 1992) (before statute of limitations is initiated, the corpus delicti of the crime must
be discovered; court in State v. Hensley, 571 N.E.2d 711 (Ohio 1991) held that the
victim's knowledge of the crime did not initiate the statute of limitations nor did the
victim's telling her mother of the sexual abuse; responsible people are limited to a group
of statutorily listed professionals such as doctors, counselors, and law enforcement offi-
cials); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 152(A) (West 1992) (five year statute of limitations
does not begin to run until the crime is discovered); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-303 (3)
(Supp. 1993) (for sexual abuse of a minor, the four year statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the crime is reported).
121 ALAsKA STAT. § 12.10.020 (action for offense committed against a person under
age 18 may be commenced anytime); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 8 (West Supp.
1992) (action may be commenced anytime if victim is under age 16).
122 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-107(B).
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH TOLLING OR EXTENDING THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS IN CASES OF REPRESSED MEMORIES
Tolling or extending the statute of limitations in cases of previ-
ously repressed memories raises a number of troublesome issues.
These concerns center primarily around the lack of empirical infor-
mation on repression in general. Serious questions exist about the
reliability of repressed memories that return ten, twenty or more
years later. Moreover, there is no agreement that repression, and
the return of repressed memories, even exists. Resolving these con-
cerns about repression is compounded by the very nature of repres-
sion which precludes experimental re-creation.
A. ARE REPRESSED MEMORIES THAT RETURN AUTHENTIC?
Are memories of childhood sex abuse, newly released from the
grip of repression, authentic? There is little to be found in the sci-
entific literature on the authenticity of previously repressed memo-
ries. One study attempted to examine the authenticity of memories,
previously repressed or otherwise, of childhood sexual abuse.' 23
The study entailed asking women to obtain verifying evidence of
their memories of childhood sexual abuse. While the study is some-
times used as evidence of authentic repressed memories, a close ex-
amination shows that it does not contain the clear verification of
repressed memories which some would like to believe it does.
In this study, fifty-three women who were being treated in ther-
apy groups for incest survivors were asked to gather corroborating
evidence of abuse. 24 Approximately three-quarters were able to
find some form of corroboration, although in several cases the suffi-
ciency of the corroboration may have been debatable.125 Even if the
corroboration was shown to be trustworthy, the data from this study
was not, unfortunately, presented in sufficient detail for readers to
know if any of the repressed-memory survivors were among those
who provided corroboration. 126
123 Herman & Schatzow, supra note 18, at 3-12.
124 Id. at 2-3.
125 The study includes in its definition of corroborating evidence statements by others
that they too believe they were the victims of child sexual abuse perpetrated on them by
the same individual. Id. at 10. Such evidence is inadmissible in most, if not all, court
proceedings. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (banning admission of similar acts to prove the
defendant acted in conformity therewith).
126 In the study, only 14 of the subjects were reported as having "severe memory
defects." Herman & Schatzow, supra note 18, at 5. However, 14 subjects also were un-
able to confirm their abuse or obtain any corroborating evidence. Id. at 10-11. The




In addition to the above study, individual clinical cases are used
as a basis for establishing the authenticity of previously repressed
memories. Nevertheless, even though examples of inconsistencies
in the memories can be found in the clinical cases, clinicians would
argue, without further proof, that the core of the memory is still
valid.
Others in the field are not as convinced. They believe that, as
with hypnosis, the therapeutic environment can be so suggestive
that if a therapist goes looking for a memory of childhood sexual
abuse, "it is more likely they'll find it whether it happened or
not." 127 Thus, although the individual subjects may be honest,
skeptics tend to disbelieve the clinical results as products of expecta-
tions and suggestive techniques. 128
But while researchers attempt to discover more about the na-
ture and validity of repressed memory, jurists are faced with difficult
authenticity questions to which there are currently no empirical an-
swers. In light of the need for authentication of repressed memo-
ries, other analytical tools must be utilized.
B. APPLICATION OF TRADITIONAL MEMORY CONCEPTS TO REPRESSED
MEMORIES WHICH HAVE RETURNED
Volumes have been written about the reliability of normal
memories. Laboratory experiments demonstrate that at each stage
of memory-perception, retention, and retrieval-a host of factors
may introduce error into the subject's memory.' 29 Thus, the mood
at perception, information learned after an event, or the environ-
ment in which a subject recalls a memory have all been shown to
affect the accuracy of a memory.' 30
It is not known if repressed memories are more or less suscepti-
ble to erroneous data then standard memories.' 3 ' However, a com-
parative analysis of repressed memories, using the body of empirical
information on standard memories, is useful. Such an analysis dem-
onstrates that previously repressed memories are often exposed to
factors which have been experimentally demonstrated to introduce
error into standard memories.
127 Oldenburg, supra note 7, at D5 (statement of Richard Mikesell, a Washington, D.
C. psychotherapist).
128 Id.
129 See, e.g., LoFrus, supra note 15, at 20-109.
130 Id.




The perception phase involves the subject experiencing an
event which is then committed to memory. At this stage, factors
such as time of exposure, familiarity with the subject, and stressful-
ness of the event have been shown to affect the accuracy of the re-
sultant memory.' 3 2 Thus, the subject who experiences an event for
a short time, or is unfamiliar with the subject, or is under a great
deal of stress during the event will often retain a less accurate mem-
ory of that event.' 33
A misperception of an original event obviously leads to an inac-
curate memory; an accurate memory was never recorded. One rea-
son why the initial formation of memory could be inaccurate is that
it is heavily influenced by context.' 3 4 The contextual interpretation
that an individual gives to a situation will affect how the situation is
perceived. In many instances, critical aspects of an event may be
missed because they are not relevant to the context the individual is
using at the time of an event. 135 Also, some aspects could be exag-
gerated to reflect the interpretation used at the time.' 3 6 The rules
which guide the construction of an event in the first place, combined
with context and expectancy effects, can lead an individual to per-
ceive qualities that do not occur.
2. Retention
After some critical event is over, and some information is stored
in memory, time passes. This phase of the process is referred to as
the retention phase. 13 7 During retention, people are often exposed
to new information which can influence their recollection of the
past. The change in report arising from such postevent misinforma-
tion has been referred to as the "Misinformation Effect."' 38 This
effect has been found in scores of studies, and there seems to be
little doubt that erroneous reporting is easy to induce. 139 Due to
132 LoF-rus, supra note 15, at 20-51.
133 Id. at 23-51.
134 See generally MEMORY IN CONTEXT: CONTEXT IN MEMORY (Graham M. Davies & Don-
ald M. Thomson eds., 1988).
135 Id.
136 ELIZABETHi Lo'rus, MEMORY 145 (1980); LoF-rus, supra note 15, at 80 (1979).
137 LoF-rus, supra note 15, at 52-87.
138 Elizabeth F. Loftus & Hunter G. Hoffman, Misinformation and Memory: The Creation
of New Memories, 118 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 100-104 (1989).
139 False reports of memories stimulated by misleading postevent exposures have
been reported in the United States. See, e.g., Robert F. Belli, Influences of Misleading Pos-
tevent Information: Misinformation Interference and Acceptance, 118 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: GEN. 72 (1989); Stephen J. Ceci et al., Age Differences in Suggestibility: Narrowing
the Uncertainties, in CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 79 (Stephen J. Ceci et al. eds.,
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information received after perception of an event, people have re-
called nonexistent broken glass and tape recorders, a clean-shaven
man as having a mustache, straight hair as curly, stop signs as yield
signs, hammers as screwdrivers, and even something as large and
conspicuous as a barn in a bucolic scene which contained no build-
ings at all. 140
Retention is, however, somewhat of a mystery in cases of re-
pression. Little is known about how and where a repressed memory
might be stored in the brain. It is likely, however, that a repressed
memory would be affected by new inputs,' 4 ' and indeed, while ex-
perimental evidence is lacking, there is anecdotal evidence that "re-
pressed memories" may be altered by additional information
received.142 One reason why repressed memories would be ex-
pected to be especially vulnerable to new inputs is because the al-
leged events being remembered occurred such a long time ago.
There is ample evidence that as time passes, memory becomes in-
creasingly malleable and susceptible to new information. 143
There is one way in which repressed memories clearly differ
from other memories; they are by definition not consciously re-
hearsed. Rehearsal provides one way in which some of our memo-
ries are kept alive. 144 Everyone occasionally thinks back to some
favorite scenes of childhood, thus making them stronger and more
1987); Carloff C. Chandler, Specific Retroactive Interference in Modified Recognition Tests: Evi-
dencefor an Unknown Cause of Interference, 15J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEM-
oRY, & COGNITION 256 (1989); Neal Kroll & Keith H. Ogawa, Retrieval of the Irretrievable:
The Effect of Sequential Information on Response Bias, in I PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF MEMORY:
CURRENT RESEARCH AND ISSUES 490 (Michael Gruneberg et al. eds., 1988); D. Stephen
Lindsay, Misleading Suggestions Can Impair Eyewitness's Ability to Remember Event Details, 16(6)
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 1077 (1990). For studies
conducted in other nations, see, e.g., Richard Hammersley &J. Don Read, What is Integra-
tion? Remembering a Story and Remembering False Implications About the Story, 77 BRIT. J.
PSYCHOL. 329 (1986) (Canada); Felicity Gibling & Graham Davies, Reinstatement of Context
Following Exposure to Post-Event Information, 79 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 129 (1988) (United
Kingdom); Gunter Kohnken & Claudia Brockmann, Unspecific Postevent Information, Attri-
bution of Responsibility, and Eyewitness Performance, I APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 197
(1987) (Germany); Peter Sheehan, Confidence, Memory, and Hypnosis, in HYPNOSIS AND
MEMORY 95 (Helen Pettinati ed., 1988) (Australia); Willem A. Wagenaar &Johannes P.
Boer, Misleading Postevent Information: Testing Parameterized Models of Integration in Memory,
66 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 291 (1987) (Netherlands).
140 LoFrus, supra note 15, at 20-109; Elizabeth F. Loftus, When a Lie Becomes Memory's
Truth: Memory Distortion After Exposure to Misinformation, 1 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH.
SCI. 121 (1992).
141 Loftus & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 9-11.
142 After her initial report of a memory, Franklin-Lipsker changed her story six times,
apparently keeping pace with new information she received. Daughter's Words, supra note
46, at 26.
143 LoFrus, supra note 15, at 64-65.
144 Loftus & Kaufman, supra note 10, at 10-11.
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vivid. Repressed memories, however, miss this opportunity to be
rehearsed. On the one hand, this has lead some psychologists to
suggest that they are only fantasies, or "skeletons filled in with plau-
sibilities."'' 45 On the other hand, given that reconstructive rehearsal
often leads to the modification of memory, this opportunity for
modifying the memories is missing as well.146
3. Retrieval
The third and final stage in the memory process is the retrieval
of a memory. Again, experiments demonstrate the ability of exter-
nal factors to introduce error into a memory during the retrieval
stage. The factors which influence the retrieval of a memory include
the environment in which the memory is retrieved, expectations cre-
ated in the subject's mind, the techniques used to retrieve the mem-
ory, and persons present. 14 7
Based on theory alone one would expect repressed memories
surfacing twenty or thirty years later to be especially prone to new
inputs, suggestive questioning, and other sources of new informa-
tion. This stems in part from the finding that it is the older memo-
ries that are especially malleable. 48 The retrieval stage is most
amenable to critical examination since the conditions under which
an allegedly "de-repressed" memory returns can sometimes be
closely examined and evaluated.
The environment in which a memory is recalled may have sub-
tle, or perhaps not so subtle, influences. Expectations may be cre-
ated in the subject's mind. Thus, if a patient sees a therapist who
specializes in counseling survivors of childhood sexual abuse, that
patient may form assumptions about what is expected. One thera-
pist stated that every single client who comes to her discovers re-
pressed memories of childhood sexual abuse. 149 While this could
reflect the type of client referred to her, it could also be the result of
other, external factors leading to the recovery of a false memory.
Regardless, a patient attending counseling sessions with a child-
hood sexual abuse specialist may form strong presumptions about
what the therapy is supposed to uncover.
In other cases, therapists themselves may enter the counseling
sessions with a bias toward uncovering repressed memories of child-
hood sexual abuse. One clinician advocates that "[i]t is crucial ...
145 Id. at 11.
146 Id. at 10.
147 LoF-rus, supra note 15, at 88-108.
148 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
149 Hendrix, supra note 5, at El, E16.
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that clinicians ask about sexual abuse during every intake." 150 The
rationale for this prescription is that the clinician who addresses a
patient in this way conveys to her that the patient will be believed,
and that the clinician will join with the patient in working through
the memories and emotions linked with childhood sexual abuse.
While it may be natural to ask about previous abuse, one must ask
whether the asking unlocks a repressed memory or suggests it.
Other therapists use different techniques that may introduce
bias into a counseling session. One uses a questionnaire in the ini-
tial interview which contains only general questions about health,
education, and occupation, but very detailed questions about in-
cest. 15 1 Another therapist, who has treated more than 1500 incest
victims, 152 openly describes her method of approaching patients.'53
Her method, which involves informing a patient that other people
with similar problems were abused as children, exemplifies the bias
and suggestiveness involved in some methods.' 54
It is difficult in individual cases to discern whether or not bias
affects a memory. One woman, "Dana," was court-ordered to un-
dergo therapy when her three year old daughter, Christy, was mo-
lested by Christy's father. In Dana's words: "I was in therapy
talking about Christy, and instead of saying 'Christy' I said 'I'. And I
didn't even catch it. My therapist did. She had always suspected
that I was abused too. . . ."-55 Soon, after her therapist picked up
this slip and began questioning her about possible incest, Dana was
remembering that her own father had done to her some of the very
things that her husband was doing to Christy. Whether these mem-
ories resulted from events long repressed or a bias introduced into
the therapeutic sessions may never be known.
Another possible source for the introduction of error into a
memory is the therapeutic technique itself. Group therapy is com-
mon for survivors and may have real therapeutic benefits. It does,
however, create a danger of suggestiveness and the potential for
creating false memories. The stories told by others, the open sug-
gestions, and the expectations built around such therapy may have a
150 Frawley, supra note 2, at 251.
151 Adult Illnesses Can Stem From Childhood Incest, Study Shows, Proprietary to the United
Press International, Mar. 25, 1988, AM cycle.
152 FORWARD & BUCK, supra note 59, at 160.
153 Id. at 161.
154 "You know, in my experience, a lot of people who are struggling with many of the
same problems you are, have often had some kind of really painful things happen to
them as kids-maybe they were beaten or molested. And I wonder if anything like that
ever happened to you?" Id.
155 ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL 78 (1988).
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powerful effect on a client whose behavioral history matches that of
other survivors of childhood sexual abuse. One woman attended a
support group which contained survivors of childhood sexual abuse.
She later sought out a psychiatrist with experience treating survivors
of child abuse to ask if her vague memories and feelings "meant"
that she was an incest victim.1 5 6 Doctors should, and some do, re-
spond to these cases with caution, recognizing that group therapy
contains an element of suggestibility "that sometimes is pushed too
far."' 157 Others have warned about a potential problem with group
therapy, especially for persons who currently have no memory of
childhood sexual abuse. "In their eagerness to belong and to iden-
tify with other group members, these clients tend to place enormous
pressure on themselves to remember an abuse experience once they
begin a cycle of group therapy."' 58
In another currently popular technique, therapists advise pa-
tients to "make stories up" or "fantasize" or "guess" about the
cause of their current feelings.' 59 The patient is then asked to ex-
pand, add detail, and essentially create an entire memory.160 Addi-
tionally, when the patient evinces uncertainty about the memory,
therapists find it important to reassure the subject and to state their
belief in the subject's story.' 6 ' Some therapists engage in these
questionable procedures because they believe that they are the
route to accessing genuine memories, and that the products of these
procedures do lead to genuine memories. This, unfortunately, may
not be the case. While not all patients later accept such memories as
real, some individuals may later have difficulty distinguishing be-
tween the created and real memories.
Still another technique currently used by some therapists in-
volves giving their patients books or booklets to read when the ther-
apist suspects sexual abuse. The books often contain lists of criteria
which, if satisfied, are meant to suggest the patient was abused. One
book tells readers that they were abused if "You felt unloved... ;
you ... were verbally put down on a regular basis; you were physi-
cally hit; ... you were sexually violated."' 162 An examination of sev-
eral other popular books on sexual abuse reveals such messages as:
"you may realize you were abused, but have only vague images or
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 SGROI, supra note 52, at 118-19.
159 Olio, supra note 3, at 95.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 97.
162 KRISTIN A. KUNZMAN, THE HEALING WAY: ADULT RECOVERY FROM CHILDHOOD
SEXUAL ABUSE 17 (1990).
160 [Vol. 84
MEMORY REPRESSION
fragmented memories of the abuse;". "you need to feel safe in order
to remember what happened;" and "if you keep thinking something
bad happened to you, it probably did."1 63
All of the above methods of therapy involve a high level of sug-
gestibility. Although it is not known exactly what effect such sugges-
tions may have upon a previously repressed memory, such
techniques would almost certainly have an effect on regular, non-
repressed memories. 64 Thus, until more is known about the vul-
nerability of repressed memories, memories surfacing in the face of
suggestive therapeutic techniques should be treated with suspicion.
It is important to note that therapists may not be especially con-
cerned about the particular accuracy of a recovered memory. Since
the memory retrieval is a means toward the ultimate goal of psycho-
logical healing, the particular attributes of the memory are not a pri-
mary concern, certainly not to the extent which the law demands. In
this regard, K. V. Lanning, of the Behavioral Science Unit of the FBI
Academy, made the point that therapists who see repressed memory
cases often believe their patients in part because it allows the thera-
pist to "make sense" of the collection of symptoms. 6 5 The level of
proof necessary is not high because the consequences are only those
needed for achieving patient health. Therapists do not particularly
care about independent corroboration. But when the case heads for
the legal system, the level of proof should be more than simply an
allegation by someone.
Finally, it should be noted that some survivors may have their
memories "restored" by methods that are in themselves not legally
acceptable. Mary Doe initially had only vague and undefined
fears.1 66 Eventually, and with the help of hypnosis, she was able to
retrieve her repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse, memo-
ries which Mary wrote down and now constitute a part of her case
file. 167 Hypnosis, however, as a tool for reviving memories, has wor-
ried researchers for years, and many have urged that it not be used
in court or that it be admitted only if strict safeguards are im-
posed.168 The majority of courts that have heard cases regarding
163 Id.
164 See, e.g., LoFrus, supra note 15, at 88-109.
165 Kenneth Lanning, Ritual Abuse: A Law Enforcement View or Perspective, in 15 CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 171-73 (1991).
166 Hendrix, supra note 5, at El, E17.
167 Id. See also Oldenburg, supra note 7, at D5 (the subject's first recollections of abuse
surfaced as her therapist questioned her while she was under hypnosis).
168 Bernard L. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective
Witness, 68 CAL. L. REV. 313 (1980); T. Martin Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in
Court, 27 INT'LJ. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 231 (1979).
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the use of hypnotically refreshed testimony have resoundly banned
its use. 169 These courts found that hypnotically refreshed testimony
is either inherently unreliable, or at least that its reliability has little
support from the relevant scientific community. 170
The recognition on the part of courts that hypnosis may not be
a reliable means of enhancing memory suggests that the courts are
prepared to prevent the use of questionable techniques to enhance
memory. In the hypnosis domain, policymakers could be guided by
scores of studies demonstrating the unreliability of hypnotically re-
freshed memories. 17 1 In the repressed memory domain, no such
collection of studies demonstrating the unreliability of previously
repressed memories exist. Nor, however, does any study exist to
prove their reliability, raising a tough policy question: Do we allow
the admission of a new type of evidence until it is proven unreliable,
or do we prevent its admission until it is proven reliable? The an-
swer to this question could go either way. While the Federal Rules
of Evidence do not preclude testimony of past recollections, re-
pressed or not, testimony regarding resurfaced memory might be
ruled inadmissible under Rule 403, which provides that even rele-
vant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed
by the danger of, for example, prejudice or confusion. On the other
hand, the reliability of otherwise relevant evidence is normally left
to be challenged by the opposing party. The reliability issue is cru-
cial here, however. It forces us to ask whether a person should be
permitted to initiate a court action in the first place solely on the
basis of questionable evidence, and after significant time has passed.
C. HOW WILL TRIERS OF FACT RESPOND TO REPRESSED MEMORIES
THAT RETURN?
Judges and juries are impressed with witness testimony deliv-
ered with confidence and containing concrete details. Although re-
pressed memories often return with some vagueness, they may
evolve to have considerable detail. Additionally, a patient with a re-
pressed memory, initially often filled with doubt, may obtain a great
deal of confidence in the memory. Does this mean the memory is
accurate? Not necessarily. When false memories are created by
misinformation, the holders of these memories can describe these
169 Over 25 states exclude hypnotically refreshed or enhanced testimony. Such exclu-
sion represents the clear direction of the law in this area. State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203,
1208-09 (Utah 1989).
170 Id. at 1210.
171 Martin Orne et al., Hypnotically Induced Therapy, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSY-
CHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 171, 210 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984).
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false creations in great detail and with great conviction.' 72 More-
over, studies have shown that a subject's confidence in a specific
memory is not necessarily related to the accuracy of that mem-
ory, 173 and that judges have great difficulty discriminating between
memories that are a result of suggestion and memories that are a
result of a true perception or experience. 74
D. SLIPPERY SLOPE
Aside from problems of authenticity, there is a somewhat differ-
ent potential problem with tolling the statute of limitations: the
slippery slope. If a previously repressed memory of child sex abuse
is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations, where do we draw the
line? Should anyone with a previously repressed memory of any
type be allowed to bring suit regardless of the statute of limitations?
Hypothetical fact patterns can certainly be developed where the
legal arguments for tolling the statute of limitations would be highly
persuasive. Suppose a ten year-old child, Jane Jones, was sexually
abused and truly repressed all memory of that abuse. Imagine fur-
ther that, as an adult, her repressed memories of the abuse resurface
in an environment free of any suggestion. Aided by her clear mem-
ory, she identifies her abuser, and produces corroboration in the
form of a diary and photographs made at the time of her abuse by
her abuser. This severe hypothetical provides compelling reasons
why the survivor should be allowed to pursue her case. She obvi-
ously could not have discovered her harm until she had the con-
scious capacity to do so, and could not have pursued her case until
that discovery was made.
While many people would agree that the above hypothetical
survivor should be allowed her day in court, once courts toll the
statute of limitations on this case, where does it stop? There are
several potential areas of expansion. First, should the exception be
expanded from sexual abuse to include physical abuse or even to
mental or verbal abuse? Physical abuse and neglect of children are
very serious problems. Studies have documented the alarming level
of serious violence against children. For example, one study sug-
gested that one in every twenty-five children between the ages of
three and seventeen living in a dual parent household were seriously
172 ELIZABETH LoFrus & KATHY KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE 208 (1990).
173 Lorrus, supra note 15, at 100-01.
174 Jonathan Schooler et al., Knowing When Memory is Real, in PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF
MEMORY: CURRENT RESEARCH AND ISSUES. VOL 1: MEMORY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 83-88
(Michael Gruneberg et al. eds., 1988).
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beaten by a parent or threatened with a gun or knife. 175 This figure
translates into over 46,000 children who were shot or stabbed by
parents, with over 1,000 dying as a result of their injuries. Will the
tolling of the statute of limitations be expanded to cover repressed
memory for instances of physical abuse?
Another area for expansion concerns the status of the victim.
Should the statute be tolled only for victims who are below the age
of majority, or does the exception encompass all victims who re-
press their memories of a wrongful event? What if a twenty-five year
old person is sexually assaulted and claims a repressed memory for
the attack until she reaches forty? Should the tolling of the statutes
of limitations be expanded to cover this case?
The final slippery slope issue is one of the completeness of the
memory. If a person retains some memories of childhood sexual
abuse, but later remembers more incidents, or remembers the abuse
in greater detail, should these later recovered memories serve as the
basis for tolling the statute of limitations? 76
We raise these slippery slope issues only in the hypothetical and
make no effort to answer these questions. However, states that have
recognized the application of the discovery rule to cases of re-
pressed memories of childhood sexual abuse have not yet exper-
ienced a flood or even a trickle of litigation from the slippery slope
cases. 177 Nevertheless, one should not dismiss the potential. As the
theory of repression becomes known, more and more cases may
surface.
V. SOLUTIONS
The unanswered reliability issues surrounding repressed mem-
ories require that they be treated differently then normal memories
175 Daro, supra note 1, at 12.
176 In Nicholette v. Carey, 751 F. Supp. 695 (W.D. Mich. 1990), there existed a one-
year statute of limitations which began after a victim of childhood sexual abuse regained
a previously repressed memory. The court, however, allowed the plaintiff's case to toll
the statute of limitations even though there was proof she remembered at least three or
four incidents of sexual abuse more then one year prior to bringing the suit. The court
held that since the plaintiff recovered memories of further incidents and the recovery
took place less then one year from the filing date, the statute of limitations was tolled as
to the additional acts.
177 Indeed, a review of recent cases reveals only one exception, the murder case of
George Franklin, which was based on the previously repressed memory of Franklin's
daughter, Eileen Franklin-Lipsker. Ms. Franklin-Lipsker stated she had witnessed the
crime but had repressed her memory of it. The case is distinguishable, however, from
the slippery slope question, in that the repressed memory was not used to toll the statute
of limitations, there is no statute of limitations on murder in California. Barbara Kantro-
witz & Nadine Joseph, Forgetting to Remember, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 11, 1991, at 58.
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and several alternative methods of treatment should be consid-
ered.178 Some of these alternatives have insurmountable problems
which may force their rejection, but consideration of these alterna-
tives may serve to stimulate policymakers to examine other more
pragmatic measures.
A. DO NOT TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CASES
CONCERNING A PREVIOUSLY REPRESSED MEMORY
Until recently courts have not tolled the statute of limitations
for cases of previously repressed memories. Should we return to
that state of affairs? There are at least two ways to look at this issue.
Tolling the statute of limitations may be necessary so that some
worthy plaintiffs are not denied justice, and some genuine perpetra-
tors cannot freely escape punishment for their acts. It would be
necessary in order for survivor Jane Jones in our hypothetical case
to seek justice. Without tolling, Jones' trauma would be un-
redressed, and the tactics of her perpetrator would go unpunished.
There is a real sense of unfairness about this.
On the other hand, adoption of a rule that says that the statute
of limitations is not tolled in these cases protects defendants aginst
old claims that are difficult to defend against. It prevents the inno-
cently accused of being dragged through the legal system, and fami-
lies from being further wrenched apart. It might even encourage
victims, family members, and others to come forward sooner when
child sexual abuse is suspected.
Perhaps a beginning point in examining this question is to take
a step back and ask whether the courts will, in any case, allow testi-
mony based upon "de-repressed" memories? Perhaps there is a les-
son to be learned from examining the admissibility of hynotically
enhanced testimony.
Indeed, courts initially displayed a tendency to admit hynoti-
cally enhanced testimony as scientific and reliable. 179 Courts did not
begin to resoundly prohibit the use of hynotically enhanced testi-
mony until years of scientific studies proved the malleability and
general unreliability of the resulting memory and subsequent testi-
mony. °8 0 Thus, courts now routinely disallow the use of such testi-
178 The following solutions analysis is an adaptation and expansion of an approach
used to analyze possible solutions to problems associated with eyewitness testimony in
general as used in Fredrick Woocher, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Testimony on the
Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969 (1977).
179 See, e.g., Harding v. State, 246 A.2d 302, 306 (Md. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949
(1969); State v. McQueen, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427 (N.C. 1978).
180 Lorrus, supra note 15, at 104-08.
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mony as scientifically unreliable, or because jurors, innocently
believing in the power of hypnosis, will give the testimony undue
credence. t81
Newly resurfaced repressed memories, on the other hand, pres-
ent a different case. Unlike hypnotically enhanced memories, where
a good deal of research has documented the lack of reliability, when
it comes to "de-repressed" memories, little or no such research ex-
ists. There is a problematic lack of evidence as to whether or not
these recollections are authentic. There are cases in which the
memories have been proven to be false, often arising from known
sources of suggestion. But in the vast majority of cases, since cor-
roboration is lacking, there is simply no way to know whether they
are real or not.
The Federal Rules of Evidence proclaim that any competent
witness may testify on any matter regarding that which the witness
has personal information.' 8 2 We could presume that the memories
are reliable until proven otherwise, just as we did in the case of hyp-
notically enhanced memories. We could then also presume that
such memories would justify tolling the statute of limitations. But in
doing so, we should not overlook the large cost in terms of due pro-
cess for defendants.
B. REQUIRE CORROBORATING EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF A RETURNED
MEMORY
Another solution, adopted by several courts in addressing the
reliability-due process problem,' 83 allows for the tolling of the stat-
ute of limitations, but only where resurfaced memories can be sup-
ported by corroborating evidence. A corroboration requirement,
however, creates some clear difficulties. The initial problem with a
corroboration requirement is the definition of corroboration itself.
What type and amount of evidence would be required for corrobo-
ration? While an abuser's diary, describing in minute detail the
abuse he inflicted, is clearly corroborative in one case, 18 4 is the testi-
181 State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1209 (Utah 1989).
182 FED. R. EvID. 601, 602.
183 See Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing
the statute of limitations to be tolled if: a) the plaintiff can make out a case that she
repressed the memory of the facts on which her claim is predicated and b) there is cor-
roborating evidence for plaintiff's testimony that the sexual assault occurred); Peterson
v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18, 25 (Nev. 1990) (court held that no statute of limitations existed in
cases of alleged childhood sexual abuse where the plaintiff could show by clear and
convincing evidence that the named defendant had sexually abused the plaintiff as a
minor).
184 Herman and Schatzow, supra note 18, at 1-14.
[Vol. 84
MEMORY REPRESSION
mony of a sister that she too was sexually abused sufficiently corrob-
orative in another?18 5
These questions underscore the uncertainty as to what consti-
tutes sufficient corroboration. They also introduce another prob-
lem with a corroboration requirement: such a requirement gives the
judge involved much discretionary power. The examination of the
supporting evidence would, in effect, be a fact-finding by a judge.
In the event that a judge decides that a memory has not been prop-
erly corroborated and thus declines to toll the statute of limitations,
the case would be decided without ever having presented the evi-
dence to a jury. Some would argue that this solution infringes on
the dominion of the jury, which is to be the sole finder of fact and
determiner of the credibility of a particular witness. Others would
point to the fact that judges routinely examine the sufficiency of evi-
dence in the absence of the jury, for example, when they decide on
motions for summary judgment.
It must be acknowledged that the requirement of corroboration
might have the effect of unfairly barring valid suits. Imagine the
difficulty faced by a survivor of childhood sexual abuse trying to ob-
tain corroborating evidence for acts that occurred ten, twenty, or
more years previously. Additionally, survivors may have long since
severed all ties with their families, friends, and past, making collec-
tion of corroborating evidence difficult or impossible.
C. ADOPT SPECIFIC PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN CASES
INVOLVING THE RETURN OF A PREVIOUSLY REPRESSED
MEMORY
While there are costs in allowing the statute of limitations to
run during the period that a memory of childhood sexual abuse is
repressed, there are also costs in allowing old claims to be pursued
without some procedural safeguards. Indeed, once the decision is
made to toll the statute of limitations and to allow a childhood sex-
ual abuse suit based upon a repressed memory, several factors indi-
cate the need for caution: (1) little is empirically known about
repressed memories and their reliability, (2) when empirical infor-
mation concerning standard memories is used to analyze repressed
memories, repressed memories would be expected to be especially
malleable and unreliable, (3) a sizable percentage of child abuse
185 Id. Note that FED. R. EVID. 404(b), which provides that "evidence of prior acts is
not admissible to show action in conformity therewith," would render the use of such
corroborative evidence at trial unlikely.
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cases are spurious, 186 and (4) the mere accusation of child abuse has
a dramatic and negative effect on the professional, personal and so-
cial relationships of an accused. Several procedural requirements
can help minimize the possibility of a fact-finding body accepting an
erroneous memory, and mitigate the damage of a suit filed against
an innocent defendant.
1. Require Fictitious Names
Child abuse is a horrible crime and its perpetrators are among
the most despised of criminals. An accusation of child sexual abuse
brings with it an immense and unshakeable stigma. Even false accu-
sations can destroy a person's reputation, ruin personal relation-
ships, and shatter long standing careers. 187 Recognizing the onus
associated with an accusation, one potential procedural requirement
in cases involving repressed memories of child abuse is to require
both parties to assume fictitious names for use in all matters associ-
ated with the lawsuit. 188
The use of fictitious names during a lawsuit protects both par-
ties from unwanted and perhaps undeserved publicity. Addition-
ally, in the event of a judgment in favor of the defendant, the use of
a fictitious name in the lawsuit protects the defendant from the un-
warranted stigma of being a child molester. Although this proce-
dural requirement is not linked with ascertaining the truth of the
allegation, it recognizes the unreliability concerns surrounding re-
pressed memories.
Requiring fictitious names to be used by the parties to a lawsuit
is rarely a safeguard utilized in other civil or criminal actions
(although there are exceptions, as in juvenile proceedings, or in
cases that are filed under seal). But here we recognize that so little
186 In 1988, the United States Department of Health and Human Services reported
that 48% of all incidents of abuse reported to child welfare agencies were unfounded.
Rebecca Kuzins, False Accusations, L.A. LAWYER, Sept. 1989, at 58. Although this figure
does not reflect cases of adult survivors bringing suit against their abusers, it does reflect
a large problem surrounding false accusations of child abuse. Another study, conducted
by the National Center of Child Abuse and Neglect, reported that the figure for un-
founded or unsubstantiated accusations of child sexual abuse is between 65 and 80% of
all cases. Id. Claims that large proportions of child sex abuse allegations are false occur
routinely in child custody cases. A recent article in a Canadian journal suggested that a
full 25% of all allegations in this type of case are unfounded. D. Mayland McKimm,
Child Sexual Abuse Allegations in Custody Cases: The Substantive Law, 49 THE ADVOCATE 407-
13 (May 1991).
187 Kuzins, supra note 186, at 59.
188 In Mary D. v.John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), the parties assumed




is known about the authenticity of recently recovered, previously re-
pressed memories, and that there is good reason to be worried
about their potential for error. Such a safeguard would at least af-
ford an accused protection from allegations based upon repressed
memories until the whole issue of the authenticity of repressed
memories is better understood.
2. Limit Evidence
Most jurisdictions have rules of evidence similar to Federal
Rule 404(b), which prohibits the use of evidence of other conduct of
the defendant to prove similar conduct on the occasion in ques-
tion. 189 This rule is based upon a belief that such evidence has un-
due sway over a jury; it is difficult for the jury to erase the notion
that a person who has once committed a crime is more likely to do
so again.'9 0 Such evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts simply
weighs too much with a jury, causing prejudice and loss of a fair
opportunity to defend against a particular charge.' 9 ' Furthermore,
such evidence is sometimes of marginal probative value in determin-
ing how the defendant acted on a subsequent occasion. 192 There-
fore, under this rule a plaintiff may not show that the defendant
committed completely different acts of child sexual abuse on unre-
lated people to support the allegation that the defendant abused the
plaintiff as well.
This rule, however, does not prohibit all use of prior act evi-
dence. It allows the admission of such evidence for the purpose of
proving motive, opportunity, or other factors not directly related to
proving conduct in conformity with the prior act. '9 Consequently,
courts routinely admit evidence of other crimes accompanied by a
limiting instruction that directs the jury not to use the evidence of
prior acts to form an assumption that the defendant acted similarly
during the time in question. 194 The effectiveness of such instruc-
tions however, is a convenient fiction at best, and it has been noted
that limiting instructions can sometimes make the problem worse,
189 FED. R. EVID. 404(b): "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity there-
with. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, op-
portunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident ......
19o State v. Jones, 677 P. 2d 113, 120 (Wash. 1984).
191 Michelson v. United States, 335 U. S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
192 Robert H. Aronson, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN WASHINGTON 404-06 (1989).
193 See supra note 189.




drawing attention to the evidence that is not to be considered.' 9 5
In repressed memory cases, if they are to go forward, one could
argue for a modification of Rule 404(b), such that evidence of prior
sexual conduct would not be admissible for any purpose in child
sexual abuse cases. In one case, 19 6 for example, evidence of early
pre-teenage homosexual experimentation on the part of a defen-
dant was allowed in court as corroboration for a daughter's resur-
faced memory of acts of rape. The damaging effect of such
testimony is clear, and its probative value minimal. Given the emo-
tional and prejudicial value the introduction of such evidence has in
a child sexual abuse case, it is arguable that the use of all such evi-
dence should be prohibited.
On the other hand, while limiting evidence in this way would
reduce the chances of erroneous conviction, it would not prevent a
potentially innocent defendant from being hauled into court in the
first place. Nor would it directly address the potential unreliability
of resurfaced-memory testimony. If anything, the antidote to unre-
liability is more evidence, not less. Consequently, an argument
could be made for the opposite approach, that is, amending Rule
404(b) such that in sexual abuse cases, evidence of prior commis-
sion of the same offense would be admissible to support the testi-
mony of past recollections. Or, in order to avoid the problem of
unduly prejudicing a jury, such evidence could be admissible as cor-
roborating evidence in an adjudication to determine whether the
statute of limitations should be tolled. If the judge determines that
the evidence is sufficiently corroborative, and that its probative
value outweighs its prejudicial potential, the claim could then go to
trial, and the evidence could be presented to a jury.
3. Jury Instructions
One method to minimize the possibility of a jury giving undue
weight to any particular item of evidence is through the use of spe-
cific jury instructions. Jurors routinely receive at least two types of
instructions:1 9 7 "charging instructions" telling them about the law
and procedure they are supposed to follow, and "admonitions" that
warn them not to consider certain kinds of information as they ar-
195 Id. at 97-99. See also State v. Jones, 677 P.2d 131, 136 (Wash. 1984) ("Statistical
studies have shown that even with limiting instructions, a jury is more likely to convict a
defendant with a criminal record.").
196 Personal communication with attorney Steve Moen of Shafer, Moen, & Bryan, in
Seattle, Washington (1991).
197 Tanford, supra note 194, at 73.
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rive at their verdict.' 98
What more could be done with jury instructions? First, charg-
ing instructions are typically drafted by lawyers and read but once to
a jury. 99 They are known to be difficult to understand and fol-
low.2 00 Admonitions are often misunderstood and, what is worse,
they occasionally stimulate jurors to do the opposite of what they
are told.20 1
Jurors enter the legal world with their own intuitive psychology
of repression. It comes from the media or from television law pro-
grams. It may come from novels like Agatha Christie's Sleeping Mur-
der.20 2 Perhaps a jury instruction could be crafted to minimize the
chances that jurors would rely on their own intuitions, and miscon-
ceptions, about repression.
But what would such an instruction say, given the dearth of re-
search on the authenticity of repression? A blue ribbon commission
of experienced clinicians and researchers could conceivably come
together to draft a useful instruction. At the very least an instruc-
tion might inform the jury about the scientific controversy sur-
rounding the authenticity of repressed memories.
4. Admit Expert Testimony on Reliability of Memories at the
Request of the Defendant
The courts of most states allow expert testimony at the discre-
tion of the trial judge. The Federal Rules of Evidence state: "If
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence, or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education may testify... in the form of an opinion
or otherwise." 20 3
A few states have gone further than this rule, declaring that in a
limited set of circumstances, it is an abuse of judicial discretion to
198 Id. at 73-78.
199 Id. at 79-85.
200 See, e.g., Free v. Peters, 778 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (defendant's death sen-
tence reversed after a finding that jurors might not be properly guided by semantics of
death penalty instruction). To avoid confusing the jury, judges often will, in addition to
reading the instructions to a jury, allow the jurors to review a written copy during
deliberation.
201 Tanford, supra note 194, at 86-87.
202 AGATHA CHRISTIE, SLEEPING MURDER (1976). This story, Miss Marple's last case, is
about a woman, Gwenda, who witnesses a murder as a three year old child. Her "mem-
ory" returns 18 years later when she coincidentally returns to the house where the mur-
der occurred. Although cautioned to "let sleeping murder lie," curiosity compels her to
investigate. Id. at 53.
203 FED. R. EvID. 702.
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overrule the use of experts. 20 4 These cases most often deal with
expert testimony concerning eyewitness testimony. The guidelines
of the state of Washington as to when expert testimony must be ad-
mitted upon the request of the defendant are representative:
1. an eyewitness identification is the principal issue at trial;
2. the defendant presents an alibi defense; and
3. there is little or no other evidence linking the defendant to
the crime. 20 5
Although cases concerning resurfaced memories of childhood
sexual abuse may loosely fit into these requirements, the lack of
unanimity in adopting these requirements, 206 and their inexact fit to
cases of child abuse, requires a separate, conclusive rule to be
adopted for cases of repressed memories. Such a rule would re-
move the introduction of expert testimony from the discretion of
the judge and make it a right exercisable by a defendant who seeks
it.
Experts testifying in cases concerning repressed memories
could testify on several issues. First, experts could review the litera-
ture and scientific background on repressed memories. The expert
could emphasize that very little is known about repression of memo-
ries and their subsequent retrieval, and that in fact many experts are
in disagreement as to its actual existence and the authenticity of the
memories so retrieved.
Experts could also discuss the science of memory more gener-
ally. They could testify as to their opinions about external influ-
ences on repressed memories and what factors may lead to the
introduction of errors. Experts could analogize between what is
known about the reliability and malleability of standard memories,
and how they think a repressed memory may be affected by the same
factors that introduce error into standard memories.
An expert could also relate to the jury what is known about wit-
ness confidence and its relationship to accuracy of recalled events.
Such an expert could testify about the nebulous correlation that ex-
ists between the confidence of a witness in the accuracy of her mem-
ory and the actual factual precision of that memory. Empirical data
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could be introduced to demonstrate that indeed, in some cases, wit-
nesses can be highly confident about inaccurate memories, and thus
caution a jury that a confident witness is not necessarily an accurate
one.
Finally, an expert for the defense could examine the circum-
stances surrounding the resurfacing of the repressed memory for
factors which may have had an influence upon the memory. Such
factors as retrieval techniques used by a therapist, expectations
formed by the subject undergoing therapy, or the suggestive atmos-
phere surrounding group therapy can all be examined by an expert
and their possible influence on the resulting memory explained.
VI. CONCLUSION
Child sexual abuse is a heinous crime and its perpetrators
should be punished. Abusers must not be permitted to get away
with such horrible acts. Genuine victims need the protection of our
society in general and our legal system in particular. The last decade
has seen a number of commendable sweeping changes in the direc-
tion of protecting genuine victims.
But what should the legal system do when claims are based on
memories that have been recently recovered decades after alleged
acts? In some cases, our legal system might want to allow these vic-
tims to use the justice system and bring suits against their abusers,
regardless of the limits placed upon their actions by traditional stat-
utes of limitations.
But the cases should not go forward without full recognition of
the rights of defendants. Given the outrage and bias against de-
fendants produced by even a hint of accusation involving child sex-
ual abuse, we urge caution. If a repressed memory case is to go
forward, courts should allow a defendant anonymity and only re-
lease names of defendants upon a guilty verdict. Finally, defendants
have a right to an impartial jury, and one informed about the diffi-
cult authenticity issues surrounding previously repressed memories.
While the balancing of rights may tip in favor of allowing some
repressed memory cases to go forward, these cases should be ex-
pected to be relatively rare until the whole subject of repressed
memories and their authenticity is better understood. Researchers
are just now beginning to take up the challenge presented by re-
pressed memories, and are attempting to gather sound data upon
which courts and juries can make informed and accurate factual
determinations. 207
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Allowing repressed memories only under rare circumstances
will surely mean that there will be some unredressed injuries result-
ing from long-ago child abuse, but, unless we want to jettison the
Constitution, this is an inevitable cost. Just as surely, the problem of
protecting today's children from horrendous abuse will not be suc-
cessfully addressed by allowing the victims to bring forty-year old
claims. Rather, efforts might be more productive if they were aimed
at detecting the crimes as, or shortly after, they happen. They will
be enhanced by educating both children and adults on how to iden-
tify signs of current abuse. When genuine offenders are identified,
they then must be vigorously prosecuted, and then either severely
punished or effectively treated.
